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McConnell: Antitrust Law

ANTITRUST LAW
PHONETELE V. AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEREGULATES MA BELL
A.

INTRODUCTION

In Phonetele u. American Telephone & Telegraph, l the
Ninth Circuit held that telephone companies have no implied
antitrust immunity under the Communications Act of 1934.1
The court held that a telephone company may, however, defend
antitrust violations by showing that it had a reasonable basis to
conclude its actions were necessitated by explicit regulatory
mandates. This note will examine federal and state regulation of
telecommunications and how the court reconciled the conflict .
between such regulations and the antitrust laws.
B.

FACTS

Plaintiffs Phonetele and DASA manufacture and market
telephone call monitoring and diverting devices for consumer
1. 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981), consolidated appeal with DASA Corporation v. General Telephone & Telegraph; (per Kennedy, J.; the other panel members were Fletcher,
J., and Claiborne, D.J., sitting by designation, diBSenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 785
(1983).
2. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 151, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 47
U.S.C. § 151 (1976». Section 151 states:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce
in communication by wire and radio so as to make available,
so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use
of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of securing a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing
authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by
granting additional authority with respect to interstate and
foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is
created a commiBBion to be known as the "Federal Communications CommiBBion", which shall be constituted as hereinafter
provided, and which shall execute and enforce the provisions
of this chapter.
.
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and business use. 8 The devices must be electrically connected to
the national telephone network to operate.
Defendant American Telephone and Telegraph (AT & T)
had prohibited, pursuant to a regulatory tariff filed with the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC),· the direct electrical connection of customer-provided equipment to the telephone
network without the use of a telephone company supplied device
known as a "protective connecting arrangement," or PCA. Defendant General Telephone and Telegraph (General) had also
filed a similar tariff with the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).II
DASA's 1973 complaint alleged that General and Ford Industries, manufacturer of another automatic call diverter, had
combined since the filing of the subject tariff to unreasonably
restrain trade in the call diverter market with a concerted goal
of suppressing competition in violation of section one of the
Sherman Act. 8 DASA further alleged that General and its coconspirators had controlled at least 90 % of the call diverter
market in particular parts of California, monopolizing that market and undertaking to destroy actual and potential competitors
in violation of section two of the Sherman Act.'
3. Phonetele manufactures and markets a device called a "Phonemaster," which,
when electrically connected to the telephone network, prevents outgoing calls to telephones that are not in preselected area codes. The result to its users is a cost savings
through prevention of misdialed or unauthorized calls.
DASA manufactures and markets the "Divert-A-Call" which is also electrically attached to the telephone system. It screens incoming calls and automatically transfers
them to other numbers or extensions. 664 F.2d at 720.
4. Revised Tariff F.C.C. No. 263, filed October 22, 1968, permitting interconnection,
provided that AT & T hardware was used to form the linkage between the customersupplied device and the telephone line. The tariff also required the customer to pay AT
& T an installation charge and a monthly service fee for the interconnecting equipment.
664 F.2d at 724.
5. C.P.U.C. Interim Decision No. 80972, April 22, 1975, finalized in May 1976, modifying General's tariff, provided for a system of registration of customer-provided equipment based on their varying technical specifications. 664 F.2d at 726.
6. Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973 & Supp. 1982)
states in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal."
7. Section two of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1973 & Supp. 1982)
states in part "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
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Phonetele's 1974 complaint alleged that AT & T, the 23
companies in which it has major interests, and its subsidiaries
Western Electric and Bell Telephone Laboratories combined
and agreed to restrain trade in the marketing, sales and distribution of Phonetele's "Phonemaster", It also alleged that these defendants conspired to monopolize the telephone terminal equipment market, and conducted tying8 arrangements, all in
violation of sections one and two of the Sherman Act9 and section three of the Clayton Act,lO
The district courts dismissed both actions on the ground
that the FCC had exclusive jurisdiction concerning the interconfelony .... "
8. To establish a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act, it must be
demonstrated that a scheme involves two distinct items and provides that one, the tying
product, may not be obtained unless the other, the tied product, is also purchased; that
the tying product possesses sufficient economic power to appreciably restrain competition in the tied product's market; and that a not insubstantial amount of commerce is
affected by the arrangement. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
9. See notes 6 and 7, supra.
10. Section three of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented,
for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or
any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the
United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount
from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement,
or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of
the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce.
Phonetele further claimed that AT & T and its operating subsidiaries control approximately 80% of the telephone lines and that this effectively gave AT & T complete
power over all 1,700 independent phone companies (such as defendant General), which
must use these interstate lines. Phoneteie also alleged AT & T's misconduct in the implementation of the relevant tariff and that AT & T was wrongfully responsible for the
conforming state tariffs and enforcement efforts. 664 F.2d at 721.
Phonetele specifically charged that the interconnection of the Phonemaster required
only a simple terminal block. It complained of the poor quality of the PCA available and
that it was only available for a time in limited parts of the country. When finally available to states outside California, Phonetele alleged that it was three-and-one-half times as
expensive as the already too expensive coupler in California. 664 F.2d at 721.
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nection of equipment with the telephone network. Those courts
found the defendants were therefore impliedly immune from antitrust suits pursuant to the FCC's authority under the Communications Act. 11
C.

BACKGROUND

The Communications Act of 1934 (the Act) provides the
FCC with regulatory powers over common carriers engaged in
telecommunications. 18 The Act's primary purpose is to further
the public interest by making available rapid and efficient telephone service. 13 The Act gives the FCC jurisdiction over interstate and foreign telephone communications, but expressly excludes FCC jurisdiction over intrastate communications. 1.
11. See Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 435 F. Supp. 207 (C.D. Cal.
1977).
The district court decision discussed the statutory and regulatory foundations of
telecommunications, concluding that the FCC's authority and the pervasive regulatory
scheme of the Act impliedly immunized AT & T from antitrust suit. See also DASA
Corp. v. General Tel. & Tel. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 61,610 (C.D. Cal. 1977). The
DASA district court decision rested on the conclusion that the FCC has exclusive jurisdiction over interconnection and therefore did not reach the implied immunity issue
with respect to General's conduct.
12. The Act specifically granted the FCC jurisdiction over "all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus and services ... incidental to [wire communications) transmission."
47 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976).
13. See note 2, supra. In addition, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976) states: "The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations 811 may be necessary in the public interest
to carry out the [Act)."
As a further part of its public interest function, the FCC has an express duty to
"keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which [the business of all carriers)
is conducted and as to technical developments and improvements in wire and radio communication ... to the end that the benefits of new inventions and developments may be
made available to [consumers)." 47 U.S.C. § 218 (1976).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976) states in part that nothing in the chapter on common
carriers "shall be construed to apply or to give the [FCC) jurisdiction with respect to (1)
charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection
with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of any carrier. . .. " It is further
provided that the FCC shall not have jurisdiction over any "connecting carrier," i.e., a
carrier which provides interstate communication only through physical connection with
another carrier not controlling it or controlled by it. 47 U.S.C. § 205 (1976). ,
Even though General is an intrastate carrier regulated by the CPUC, it is subject to
AT & T's tariffs regarding interconnection because of the potential use of terminal
equipment in interstate connections. Thus, the FCC's assertion of primary authority is
controlling over both AT & T's and General's interconnection-related conduct. This exercise of jurisdiction has been upheld. See Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204
(1974), aff'd sub nom., North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
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To carry out its policies, the Act requires that carriers file
tariffs with the FCC, outlining the carriers' plans for operation. III
No carrier may engage in business unless, upon proper notice,
tariffs have been filed, nor may a carrier change any of its practices before amending a previous tariff or by filing a new tariff. 18
A tariff must be "just and reasonable"17 and "any change,
practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful."18 The FCC may, either at its
discretion or upon the filing of a complaint by a third party,
hold hearings regarding the legality of a carrier's practices, and
may suspend a tariff pending completion of its hearings. 19 Upon
a finding that a tariff violates or may violate the Act, the FCC
may grant injunctive relief and other sanctions.20

AT & T and Interconnection Tariffs
Until 1956, AT & T's tariffs generally prohibited interconnection of all non-telephone company supplied equipment. In
Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States,21 blanket prohibitions
15. Section 203(a) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1976), requires such carriers to file
tariffs with the FCC "showing all charges ... and showing the classifications, practices,
and regulations affecting such charges."
16. 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1982).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976).
18. Id. Also, 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1976) states:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like communication service, directly or indirectly, by
any means or device, or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, class
of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person,
class of persons, or locality to any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage.
19. 47 U.S.C. § 204 (1976 & Supp. 1982) allows the FCC to suspend use of a new
tariff for 5 months. If the hearings have not been completed within that time, the tariff
becomes effective, although it may later be invalidated by the FCC.
20. Failure to obey an FCC order will result in a $1,000 fine for each violation, to be
levied each day in the case of continuing offenses. 47 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1976). A carrier
found to have violated the Act is liable to any person injured for the "full amount of
damages sustained," plus attorney's fees. 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1976). There are two avenues
of recovery: a party may sue in any United States district court, 47 U.S.C. § 207 (1976),
or a party may file a complaint with the FCC, 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1976). The FCC may
conduct an investigation and, if it concludes there are reasonable grounds to support the
complaint and the complaining party is entitled to damages, it may order the carrier to
pay. 47 U.S.C. § 209 (1976). See 664 F.2d 716, 722 n.12.
21. 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956), after remand, 22 F.C.C. 112 (1957).
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against interconnection of all such equipment were struck down.
AT & T thereafter filed a tariff prohibiting all "direct electrical
connection" and interconnection by any means of customer-provided equipment. 22 In 1965, this tariff was the subject of an antitrust suit brought against AT & T which was stayed pending
FCC review of its validity under the Act's standards. 23 That review culminated in the Carterphone decision,24 wherein the FCC
held that the subject tariff's overbreadth violated the Act's just
and reasonable standard. 211 The FCC thereafter permitted carriers to submit new tariffs allowing interconnection that would not
"adversely affect the [carrier's] operations or the telephone system's utility for others."28
AT & T responded to the new FCC mandate with a tariff
prohibiting direct electrical connection of certain devices without PCAs provided and installed by the carrier.1? Without either
affirming or rejecting the tariff, the FCC left it operational pending consideration of the effect the tariff might have on the telephone network. 28 The FCC commenced investigations and, in
1975, concluded that the latest tariff also violated the Communications Act. 29 As part of that decision, the FCC proposed a registration program which in part permitted carriers to require the
use of PCAs for certain customer-supplied terminal equipment30
The Hush-A-Phone was a cup-shaped listening device physically connected to the
telephone receiver. Requiring no electrical connection to the telephone network, it provided privacy to the user and quiet for persons around the phone. Id. at 267.
22. Tariff F.C.C. No. 132 (filed April 16, 1957), superseded by tariff F.C.C. No. 263
(filed January 2, 1968).
23. Carter v. American Tel. & Tel., 250 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Tex.), alf'd, 365 F.2d 486
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1967). The plaintiff manufactured the
Carterphone, which was inductively connected to the telephone, thereby permitting the
caller to connect his telephone to a two-way radio. 365 F.2d at 490.
24. Use of the Carterphone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d
420, reconsideration denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).
25. The tariff was found unreasonable because it "prohibit[ed) the use of harmless
as well as harmful devices." Carterphone, 13 F.C.C.2d at 424, quoted in Phonetele, 664
F.2d at 724.
26. 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424.
27. Revised Tariff F.C.C. No. 263 (filed November, 1968).
28. The FCC stated: "[W)e will permit the tariff revisions to become effective as
scheduled with the understanding that in doing so we are not giving any specific approval to the revised tariffs." See Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 723-24 n.21.
29. 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), modified in part, 57 F.C.C.2d 1216 (1976), alf'd sub.
nom. North Carolina Util. Comm'n. v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 874 (1977).
30. The program basically allows interconnection if equipment is attached with FCC
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including Phonetele's "Phonemaster" and DASA's "Divert-ACall."31

Implied Antitrust Immunity
Where Congress has failed to explicitly address the issue of
the antitrust liability of a regulated entity, courts have generally
implied such immunity to preserve the integrity of the regulatory scheme. 3s However, despite this apparent preference for
regulatory statutes, the Supreme Court has stressed that implied
antitrust immunity is strongly disfavored,33 that it should be
found only where a "clear repugnancy" between the antitrust
and regulatory laws exist,3. and only where conferring an implied antitrust immunity is necessary to make the regulatory
program work. 311
In Pan American World Airways v. United States,3e the
Court set forth a standard whereby antitrust immunity will not
be implied where the alleged antitrust violations comprise the
"precise ingredients" of the regulatory agency's authority.37
Other factors have been considered such as whether the agency
may grant adequate relief,88 whether competition is part of the
registered protective connectors or if the customer-supplied equipment is itself registered. See generally 47 C.F.R. §§ 68.100-.110 (1981). The validity of this program has
been upheld. See North Carolina Util. Comm'n. v. FCC, supra note 29.
31. CPUC's consideration and investigations of the tariffs filed by General which
paralleled AT & T's are discussed at 664 F.2d at 725-26. The "primary jurisdiction"
holding of North Carolina Util. Comm'n., supra note 29, appears to resolve any conflict
between state and federal interpretation of the similar tariffs.
32. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n. of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694
(1975) (securities dealers); Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659
(1975) (stock exchanges); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)
(generation and transmission of electrical power); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.; 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (airline parts supply); Pan American World Airways, Inc.
v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (airlines); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (national banking); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S.
439 (1945) (railroads); National Gerimedical H08p. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross
of Kansas City, 628 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1980) (group medical insurance plana).
33. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 351.
34. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra note 32, at 456.
35. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
36. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
37. [d. at 307-08.
38. The Pan Am case concerned unfair practices in air carrier route8. The action, for
trade restraint in violation of the Sherman Act, was brought by the Government and
dismissed by the Supreme Court which held that the Civil Aeronautics Board was statutorily granted the authority under the Civil Aeronautics Act to regulate the division of
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agency's guiding standards,39 whether the agency has sufficient
expertise in a particular area,40 and whether the antitrust case
involves important questions of regulatory policy.u The Court
has cautioned that where "relationships [with competitors] are
governed in the first instance by business judgment and not regulatory coercion, courts must be hesitant to conclude that Congress intended to override the fundamental national policies embodied in the antitrust laws. "42
Regarding telecommunications, most courts have found no
such immunity exists. 43 Those courts have noted the Act's silence on the subject as well as the lack of any clear indication
concerning immunity from its legislative history.44 Courts considering interconnection-related activities have held, as the
Phonetele court did, that no implied antitrust immunity exists
territories and allocation of routes between carriers. The Court stated: "Limitation of
routes and divisions of territories and the relation of common carriers to air carriers are
basic in [the Civil Aeronautics Act) regulatory scheme. The acts charged in this civil suit
as antitrust violations are precise ingredients of the Board's authority in granting, quali.eying, or denying certificates to air carriers,. . . and in allowing or disallowing affiliations
between common carriers and air carriers." 371 U.S. at 305.
39. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 94 (1953).
40. Carter, supra note 23, at 492.
41. Pan American World Airways, supra note 32, at 310.
42. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, supra note 32, at 374.
43. See, e.g., Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 610
F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Sup'p. 1314
(D.D.C. 1978); M.C'!. Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp.
1072 (N.D. Ill.), mandamus denied, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
971 (1979). For a detailed discussion of antitrust laws in the telecommunications industry, see Note, The Application of Antitrust Law to Telecommunications, 69 CALIF. L.
REv. 497 (1981); Note, AT & T and the Antitrust Laws, 85 YALE L.J. 254 (1975).
44. Federal regulation of the telecommunications industry begins with the MannElkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ I, 4, 6, 10, 13, 15,
16, 20 (1976», and the Willis-Graham Act, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921). The Senate discussions during the drafting of the Communications Act indicate that the FCC is to have
"comprehensive jurisdiction over the [telecommunications) industry." S. REP. No. 781,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
Explicit immunity from antitrust violations is found regarding certain FCC-approved consolidations and mergers of telephone companies. 47 U.S.C. § 221(a), 222(c)(1)
(1976). One court opined that the "explicit immunization of certain FCC-approved consolidations and mergers [under these sections of the Act) ... indicates that Congress
did not contemplate blanket [antitrust) immunity." Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 631 F.2d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1980).
As recently as 1970, Congress has declined to extend the applicability of the antitrust laws to telecommunications while doing so to radio. See 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1976). The
discrepancy in congressional intent appears to be based upon the interpretation that
broadcasters are not common carriers. See Note, AT & T and the Antitrust Laws, supra
note 43, at 270 n.76, citing FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/6

8

McConnell: Antitrust Law

1983]

ANTITRUST LAW

55

and that liability for violations of the antitrust laws is subject to
proof. 411
For example, in Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. CO.,48
plaintiff alleged that defendant Bell Systems' required use of its
own PCAs had violated the antitrust laws. Bell claimed that it
had required the PCAs because it did not know how otherwise
to protect the integrity of its equipment. The court noted that
determining such harm was a "factual matter to be established
at trial. The claim is relevant, if at all, only to the merits of the
antitrust charges rather than to the claim of immunity."f7
D.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

1.

The Majority

The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant telephone companies were not impliedly immune from antitrust violations, but
that they may, upon a sufficient factual showing, defend against
antitrust claims on the basis of necessary compliance with explicit regulatory mandates. fa The court did not hold that implied antitrust immunity is never applicable. Rather, ~t noted
the lack of a "simplistic and mechanically universal doctrine of
implied antitrust immunity."fe A court must therefore consider
special aspects of an industryliO as well as the existence of an
explicit regulatory mandate sufficient to confer such an immunitylll before holding that a defendant's actions shall enjoy protection from the antitrust laws.
45. See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. ~Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.
1981); Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980); Essential
Communications Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979);
Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 487 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Jarvis,
Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 481 F. Supp. 120 (D. D.C. 1978); Interconnect Planning
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 465 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. N.Y. 1978); Macom Prods. Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 359 F. Supp. 973 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
46. 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981) (propriety of design of AT & T's PCA a jury question); Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 610 F.2d 1114
(3d Cir. 1979) (facts parallel to those of Phonetele).
47. 631 F.2d at 1330 n.7.
48. 664 F.2d 716, 740.
49. Id. at 727.
50.ld.
5l. Id. at 73l.
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Special Aspects of a Regulated Industry

The court found that defendants' interpretation of the implied immunity cases ignored consideration of the special aspects of a particular industry. Specifically, the historical contexts, legislative histories and express statutory authority of the
agencies that regulate such industries differ widely.1I2
The court paid particular attention to defendants' reliance ll8
on two Supreme Court cases granting implied antitrust immunity in the securities field: Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,lI. and United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 1111. In Gordon, a group of investors had
challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
authorized fixing of stock sales commission rates as a violation
of the antitrust laws. Rejecting the challenge, the Court held
that, under the Securities Exchange Act,1I8 Congress had intended to leave supervision of the fixing of reasonable rates of
commission to the SEC and thus had impliedly immunized the
practice from antitrust suit. The Court found such immunity despite the fact that seven years prior to the grant of supervisory
power to the SEC, it had held that price fixing was a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. 1I7 Further, the Court held that implying immunity would impede the operation of the SEC which
had been successfully supervising the fixing of commissions for a
period of years. liB
In NASD, the Court found implied immunity necessary to
curb competition in mutual fund brokerage transactions. It held
52. [d. at 727-30.
53. General also relied on the so-called state action exemption of Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943). Interpreting the recent case of California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), the court stated that (1) if the
challenged restraint is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy and
(2) that policy is actively supervised by the state, such an exemption would protect General. The court did not find that the CPUC's involvement with the relevant tariff rose to
the Parker level, since the CPUC only permitted General to file the PCA tariff. As with
the FCC, this was not to be interpreted as the CPUC's (and therefore the state's) adoption of the tariff as its policy. 664 F.2d at 736.
54. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
55. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1975).
57. 422 U.S. 659, 691. The per se rule was established in United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
58. 422 U.S. at 687.
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that vertical restrictions on secondary market activities created
to limit such transactions were the exact prohibitions contemplated by the Investment Company Act of 1940. 119
The Phonetele court distinguished the securities cases by
noting the Supreme Court's deference to the SEC in order to
make the securities laws work, laws which were designed to prevent harm to investors that might occur in the absence of regulations. so In comparison, the court found, such harm to the public from the lack of regulation of interconnection had not been
shown, either through legal precedent or regulatory action. s1
The court further noted that the authority given the FCC
by statute was significantly different from that of the SEC as
evidenced by an analysis of the legislative history as well as an
examination of the language of the statutes. For example, as
found in Gordon, under the Securities Exchange Act the SEC is
given express authority to regulate the securities exchanges'
fixing of reasonable rates of commission,s2 despite Congress' understanding that an antitrust violation might result.s3 In contrast, the FCC neither approves nor disapproves an industrysubmitted tariff, nor does it adopt such tariff as agency policy or
have any obligation under the statute to find that the tariff necessarily effectuates the purpose of the Communications Act. s•

Antitrust Immunity Implied by Regulatory Mandate
The Ninth Circuit held that implied antitrust immunity
may be conferred by the presence of three elements demonstrating a regulatory mandate: (1) explicit congressional approval of
the ultimate anti competitive effect of the challenged conduct;
(2) explicit authorization by Congress to an agency or private
entity to order the challenged conduct; and (3) no inconsistency
between the challenged conduct and an express policy of the
governing agency.SII The Phonetele court found none of these el59. 422 U.S. 694, 721-22 (1975).
60. 664 F.2d at 727 n.31.
61. [d.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(I), (e)(I)(B) (1981).
63. Gordon, supra note 54, at 664-68.
64. 664 F.2d at 733.
65. This standard appears to have been culled from Gordon and NASD, i.e., that
"the agency must have sufficient freedom of action to carry out its regulatory mission,
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ements present. With respect to the third element, the court
particularly noted that, to the contrary, the FCC had clearly expressed a preference for competition unless a lack of restrictions
necessary to preventing damage to the phone system was
evident. 88
The court recognized some merit to defendants' primary argument. 87 Defendants had asserted that, after Carterphone, they
were faced with the conflicting duties of ensuring the expansion
of the use of non-telephone company supplied interconnection
devices while at the same time ensuring the safety and efficiency
of the phone network against harm from such devices. They argued that the pro-competitive purpose of the antitrust laws conflicted with the public interest purpose of the Communications
Act, therefore requiring immunity.IIS However, the court found
that no actual repugnancy existed.lIe For example, it found that
the remedies available under the Act and the antitrust laws were
complimentary,70 and that the Carterphone mandate, upon
which defendants had based their argument, was inapposite.
Carterphone, the court noted, was "itself responsive to a stay in
an antitrust case pending in the federal courts, and the FCC's
decision contemplated that the federal court would 'pass ultiand the regulated entity should not be required to act with reference to inconsistent
standards of conduct." 664 F.2d 716, 731-32.
66. Carterphone mandated that an interconnection-restricting tariff was unreasonable under the Act unless its intent was to prevent actual harm to the telephone network. Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 731 n.3S.
67. 664 F.2d at 732.
6S. The Eighth Circuit was much tougher on the telephone companies in this regard. In Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 631 F.2d 1324 (Sth Cir. 1980), the court
found the "inconsistency" that AT & T had based its argument for immunity on was
self-imposed, rather than the result of any regulatory mandate. It noted that in the filing
of its prohibitory tariffs, defendant "implements its own business judgment in regard to
its relationship with competitors." ld. at 1331.
69. 664 F.2d at 732.
70. Carterphone, supra note 24, at 421 (quoted in Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 730-31).
The court also noted that the "absence of a damages remedy under the [Act] weighs
against finding an implied antitrust immunity and gives the antitrust court a role in
enforcing the public interest standards of the [Communications Act]." ld. at 735 n.47.
Consistency could further be inferred in that it is doubtful plaintiff could recover under
both statutes. ld. at 735 n.4S. But see Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 409 F.
Supp. SOO (D.C. Puerto Rico 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1979) for the proposition
that the Communications Act does not grant a private right of action for a telephone
company's refusal to interconnect plaintiff's own phone system with the telephone network. See also Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 734 n.46 and cases cited therein.
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'''71

Regulatory Necessity as a Defense

The court concluded its decision by recognizing that, where
no implied immunity exist~, "[ilf a defendant can establish that,
at the time the various anticompetitive acts alleged . . . were
taken, it had a reasonable basis to conclude that its actions were
necessitated by concrete factual imperatives recognized as legitimate by the regulatory authority, then its actions did not violate
the antitrust laws:"72 The defense may only be established
through a factual inquiry, focusing on whether the interconnection equipment could damage defendants' equipment or disrupt
the telephone system in identifiable ways, and whether the tariff
as filed was the most reasonable, narrowly tailored method then
available to guard against harm. 73
The court made it clear that these issues were factual and
that it would not undertake an exploration of the merits of
plaintiff's claims. 74 Further, it admonished defendants that the
justification of regulatory necessity could not be based on mis71. Id. at 730-31.
72. Id. at 737-38. The court noted that General may be entitled to antitrust immunity on another ground. Its facilities were used for interstate communications and, under
Telerent, supra note 15, federal law controlled their tariffs. Therefore, "[t)o the extent
General's decision to require [PCAs) was dictated by AT & T's tariff revisions filed with
the FCC, its own PCA tariff may have been a justified, if not a coerced, compliance with
the requirements of the federal and state regulatory schemes." 664 F.2d at 737 n.56.
73. 664 F.2d at 738. The court also suggested how defendants might sustain their
burden of proof:
The defendants might, for example, attempt to demonstrate
why methods of protecting the system which did not depend
on particularized knowledge about the technical specifications
of all types of equipment that might be interconnected, would
have been either inadequate or not reasonably foreseeable.
One such method is suggested by the FCC-proposed tariff in
1975, namely the requirement that those desiring to connect
foreign equipment first notify the telephone company with the
provision that the telephone company could temporarily discontinue service to any customer whose equipment was causing actual harm to the telephone network.
Id. at 738 n.58.
74. The court stated: "These factual justifications, the resolution of which is necessarily open at this point, are to be distinguished from the various legal issues in the case
which we now foreclose." 664 F.2d at 738.
Nevertheless, in what appears to be dicta, the court surveyed Ninth Circuit law with
respect to plaintiffs' claims for antitrust violations, particularly with a view toward how
defendants might defend against them. See 664 F.2d at 738-40.
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takes of law or interpretation of the Act, judicial or FCC opin~
ions.711 Defendants would also be precluded from filing any tar~
iffs they chose or arguing they had to file tariffs absent a
demonstration of the factors required to satisfy the defense. 76

2. The Dissent
Judge Claiborne, dissenting, surveyed the four most recent
Supreme Court opinions on implied antitrust immunity.77 He ar~
gued that, under those cases, immunity must be found if three
questions are affirmatively answered:
1) Has Congress conferred upon the regulatory
agency sufficient authority to regulate the conduct which is alleged to be anticompetitive? 2)
Does the history of the regulatory agency's activities with respect to the regulation of this conduct
suggest no laxity in the exercise of this authority?
3) If the federal antitrust laws were to be construed by a federal court as outlawing the regulated activity, is there reason to believe that the
agency's regulation of the industry in question
will no longer be able to function efi'ectively?78

As to the first question, the dissent argued that Congress
had granted individuals a right of action against AT & T for
damages resulting from unjust and unreasonable practices set
forth by tariffs.78 He added that AT & T's liability is not neces~
sarily limited to anticompetitive practices. 80
As to the second question, Judge Claiborne traced the history of FCC involvement in interconnection tariffs. He noted the
studies that had been commissioned by the FCC and at least 17
states, including California, concerning the "whole matter" of interconnection. 81 Those studies had culminated in the FCC's
adoption of a federal registration program for the regulation of
75. ld. at 738.
76. The court was apparently foreclosing the argument that an antitrust-violative
tariff is reasonable or necessary until the FCC disapproves of it.
77. 664 F.2d at 747. The cases examined by the dissent were Gordon, supra note 32,
NASD, supra note 32, Hughes Tool Co., supra note 32, and Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
78. 664 F.2d at 747.
79. ld. at 750.
80.Id.
81. ld.
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interconnection of customer-provided equipment. 82 He argued
that the FCC's regulation of interconnection clearly showed no
laxity in the exercise of its authority, in one case to the point of
preempting the state public utility/service commissions. 83
As to the third question, the dissent reasoned that the FCC
should have the power to regulate interconnection. Conceding
speculation, he suggested that allowing private interconnection
in order to avoid defendants' antitrust liability might simultaneously result in harm to the telephone network. The FCC's authority to regulate would thus be impaired by what obviously
appears to be the courts' partiality to unfettered competition,
rather than deference to the FCC's role and the purpose of the
Communications Act. 8 •
The dissent acknowledged that his view would create a conflict with the Third Circuit's holding in Essential Communications Systems, Inc. v. AT & T,86 which dealt with the same issues and facts as Phonetele. Nevertheless, he found that the
Essential Communications court had failed to attend to the
holdings of Gordon86 and N ASD. 87 He found that the Essential
Communications court had especially ignored the parallels between the SEC's involvement with the regulated broker-dealers
and the FCC's involvement with the telephone companies. That
similarity, as well as the lack of specific anticompetitive language in either the relevant securities laws or the Act also required a finding of implied immunity here. 88
The dissent further noted that the existence of a "savings
clause" in the Act did not alter the general rule requiring that
plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies under the Act
prior to initiating suit. 8e The Ninth Circuit, he argued, had previously addressed that same issue and had deferred to the
82. 47 C.F.R. §§ 68.100-.506 (1981); 664 F.2d at 750.
83. 664 F.2d at 744, 750. See Telerent, supra note 14.
84. 664 F.2d at 750-51.
85. 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979).
86. Supra note 32.
87. Supra note 32.
88. 664 F.2d at 752.
89. 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1981) reads: "Nothing in this chapter contained shall in any
way abridge or alter the remedies now exi8ting at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.~' See also 664 F.2d at 751-52.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

15

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 6

62

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:47

FCC.90

E.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Communications Act was enacted for the purpose of
regulating wire communication and making available a "rapid
and efficient ... wire communication service ... with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges."91 When enacted, telecommunications technology was primitive compared with the complex
systems currently in use. Even as late as the 1950's, there were
few private companies engaged in the field and the prevailing
concern with maintaining an efficient telephone network was
with avoiding duplicative facilities, not with the possibility of
improving the phone system through the efforts of private
enterprise. 92
In this regard the Phonetele decision, at least in result, appears to embrace the spirit of the Act. There is little doubt that
plaintiffs' devices will make more rapid and efficient their consumers' use of the telephone system. All cases considered by the
courts and the FCC concerning private entries into the telecommunications marketplace have recognized such a benefit. 93 The
Phonetele decision comports with this limited precedent.
More broadly, the court commendably addressed the problem of the lack of a rational standard for implying antitrust immunity. Other courts have adopted such watchwords as "exclu- .
sive jurisdiction," "pervasive regulatory scheme," or "repeals by
implication are strongly disfavored," as starting points for inferring immunity.94 These terms add little to solving the more fundamental problem of how regulatory policy and competition can
be reconciled. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the statutory schemes of regulation, the implementation of those schemes
and the competitive situations have varied so greatly from in90. See International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913
(9th Cir. 1975).
91. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
92. In FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953), Justice Frankfurter
stated that, with regard to the congressional intent of the Communications Act, restrictions on entries into communications existed because "Congress may have considered the
possible inconvenience to the public of duplicate facilities-as would clearly be the case
with telephones .... " [d. at 92-93.
93. See notes 43 and 45, supra.
94. See notes 32-36, supra, and cases cited therein.
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dustry to industry that no coherent body of antitrust implied
immunity law really exists. Instead, the Ninth Circuit's factual
examination of "special aspects" of an industry views a regulatory statute's silence concerning antitrust immunity in light of
contemporary political policy, technology and economics.
Despite its laissez /aire result and more rational implied
immunity standard, Phonetele's reasoning is questionable. The
court appears to have ignored the clear language of the Act,
which mandates that the FCC keep itself informed "as to technical developments and improvements in wire and radio communication . . . to the end that the benefits of new inventions and
developments may be made available to [consumers]."9IiNo
doubt Congress gave the inquisitory incentive to the FCC, rather
than to the courts, as the former would obviously be better able
to conduct investigations and compile studies toward such
ends. 96 However, the Phonetele court conducted its own inquiry
as to an aspect of the Act that clearly seems the domain of the
FCC.
Even if the Phonetele decision can be seen as deferential to
the FCC's duty to keep apprised of the latest technology, the
court ignored the extent to which the FCC has actually satisfied
that duty. This is particularly true when considering
interconnection.
First, the FCC itself has expressed a preference for competition concerning interconnection. This is manifested both in its
arguments set forth in court9'1 as well as in its consistent rejection of interconnection-restricting tariffs.9s Further, there is no
95. 47 U.S.C. § 218 (1976). See United Telegraph Workers, AFL-CIO v. FCC, 436
F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970) for one court's interpretation of the great deference that should
be given the FCC to sanction new inventions in conformity with this mandate.
96. One author suggests this as Congress' abdication of responsibilities "to whatever
branch of government that seems willing to assume them." He suggests instead the formation of some entity, similar to the Temporary National Economic Committees in the
1930's, in order to study the basic conflicts between regulation and competition in each
regulated industry. See Handler, Regulation Versus Competition, 44 CINN. L. REV. 191,
205-06 (1975).
97. "The CommiBBion has never considered its authority over equipment interconnection to displace the antitrust laws." Memorandum of FCC as amicus curiae in United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978), 62 F.C.C.2d 1102,
1114 (1975).
98. For a discussion of FCC involvement with interconnection tariffs and related
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reason to assume that the FCC-proposed registration program
for interconnection devices does any less than allow for competition simultaneous with protection of the phone network. It
therefore appears that court intervention is not only inappropriate, but unnecessary to prohibit antitrust violations, at least in
t!
the discreet area of telecommunications interconnection.
Second, the court's ad hoc approach to implying antitrust
immunity forced it to completely retrace the FCC's involvement
in the area. The Commission's findings could just as well have
been found erroneous by the court, a body that has far less experience with interconnection activities than the Commission. It
thus remains unclear whether the FCC or any regulatory agency,
if subject to such scrutiny, has any de facto authority.ee
Ultimately, the decision appears to be an expression of the
court's dissatisfaction with the Act's basic regulatory scheme.
From the court's extensive exposition of the history of interconnection tariffs, and the FCC's registration program as a solution
to the instant problem, one can infer that the court sees a cumbersome, ineffective mechanism which inefficiently addresses
contemporary economic problems.
The court's view is undoubtably "fashionable" as the dissent notes. IOO However, deregulation should not be undertaken
by the judiciary.lol The inherent lack of consistency, a product
of jurisdictional and factual differences in each case, provides
little assistance toward resolving important questions of economic policy which prompted the need for antitrust laws and
activity, see Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 723-25.
99. The Act gives the United States Court of Appeals the power to review the FCC's
orders and decisions but is silent as to whether the court may review investigations of
the FCC which have not culminated in a particular order or decision. See 47 U.S.C. §
40I(b) (1976). Further, the appellate courts may only inquire into the FCC's reasoned
consideration of relevant factors, and is necessarily narrow to give proper effect to the
agency's expertise. See, e.g., Civic Telecasting Corp. v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 949 (1976).
100. 664 F.2d at 753. See supra notes 43 and 45 for some of the recent cases attacking the apparent telephone company monopolies. The recent Justice Department consent decree reflecting the breakup of AT & T and its subsidiaries is further evidence of
the "fashion".
101. The inherent limitations of the court's powers of review of the FCC arise from
47 U.S.C. § 402 (1976).
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regulatory statutes. 102
The Phonetele court may not have needed to address the
more vexing policy questions. The majority of decisions involving the antitrust liability of AT & T and similar state and local
entities have favored the entry of new products into the marketplace, particularly regarding interconnection. loa Thus, the
court's result was not unusual and unlikely to provoke any controversy. Future cases, where results are less "fashionable", will
provide a better test of whether courts should implicitly deregulate or impliedly immunize.

Mark Aveis·

NEW PRESUMPTION OF PREDATORY PRICING UNDER
THE SHERMAN ACT

A.

INTRODUCTION

In William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 1 the Ninth Circuit held that anticompetitive conduct under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act2 may be
shown by proof of pricing below the average variable cost of production (A VC). As a corollary, prices above AVC or marginal
102. Regulatory laws are predicated on the assumption that unrestrained interaction
of competitive forces in a particular industry will not serve the public interest. Antitrust
laws, on the other hand, are based on the notion that such unrestrained interaction will
yield the best allocation of economic resources. See e.g., 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 1, 4-5 (1971), cited in Phonetele v. American
Telephone & Telegraph, 435 F. Supp. 207, 210 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
103. See 664 F.2d 716, 719 n.l, and cases cited therein.
• Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law

1. 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were
Browning, J., and Peck, J., sitting by designation, dissenting) (as amended on denial of
rehearing and rehearing en bane, Feb. 10, 1982. Wallace, J., dissented from denial of
rehearing en bane and filed opinion), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982).
2. The Sherman Antitrust Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) states:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize. . . any part of the trade
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign Nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a felony .... " Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits private plaintiffs to sue for treble
damages for injuries suffered as a result of "anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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cost (MC) may be considered predatory. In addition, the court
held that in the appropriate circumstances, the other elements
of an attempted illegal monopolization may be inferred from
proof of such conduct. s
Plaintiff, an independent bakery, and defendant were competitors in the Northern California wholesale bread market.·
Both parties sold pound and pound and one half loaves of white
bread; both sold their product under a "private" label and an
"advertised" label. II Plaintiff alleged that the growth of the private label bread market in the area during 1967 and 1968 began
to weaken defendant's market for its advertised label, and that
in response, defendant undertook a strategy of predatory pricing6 to eliminate competition in the private label bread market. 7
At trial, plaintiff introduced evidence that defendant had
reduced its wholesale price on one pound loaves of private label
from nineteen cents to seventeen and two-tenths cents during
the period from 1970 to 1973.8 Also, plaintiff introduced expert
testimony that during 1972 and 1973, the price charged by defendant to wholesalers was below its average variable cost of
production. 9 It was also shown that during the late 1960's and
early 1970's, the wholesale bakers in the area were experiencing
excess productive capacity,t° and that beginning in 1967, plaintiff suffered operating losses until going out of business in 1976,
five years after filing its complaint.ll
3. Inglis also presented claims under the Robinson·Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and the California Unfair Practices Act, CAL. Bus. & PROI'.
CODE §§ 17000·17101 (West 1982). This note will focus solely on the Sherman Act claims.
4. William Inglis & Sons v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410, 416
(N.D. Cal. 1978).
5. Id. Private label bread is sold under a brand name individual to the purchasing
store. Advertised label is a national brand name available to all stores. Plaintiff's adver·
tised label was "Sunbeam", and defendant's was "Wonderbread". The chief difference,
aside from label design and packaging, is the price. This being the case, an advertised
label is more profitable than a private label. Id.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 40·55 for a discussion of predatory pricing.
7. By driving out competitors, defendant could raise prices of private label and reo
duce the competitive disadvantage of its highly profitable "Wonderbread". 461 F. Supp.
at 416.
8. 668 F.2d 1014, 1025.
9. 461 F. Supp. 410, 418.
10. This was due in part to the establishment of "captive bakeries" by large chain
stores. Id. at 416.
11. 668 F.2d 1014, 1024.
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On this evidence, the jury awarded over four million dollars
in treble damages on plaintiff's claim of attempted monopolization. 12 The trial judge granted defendant's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and alternatively, for
a new trial. 13 In granting the JNOV, the trial judge concluded
that plaintiff's showing of below average variable cost pricing
was not competent evidence to state a prima facie case of price
predation. 14 Although the court recognized that average variable
cost may be used as an evidentiary surrogate for marginal cost,
the standard endorsed in the Ninth Circuit, there may be cases
that are not amenable to this substitution.1O Even if this were a
case where average variable cost could be used as evidence, the
district court judge found that plaintiff's evidence of this cost
figure was erroneous, and that in itself would warrant a JNOV.16
The unreliability of plaintiff's cost study was cited as the reason
for granting the new trial motion as well.17
The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of JNOV, but concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
granting a new trial. 18
B.

BACKGROUND

In order to state a claim for attempted monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, three basic elements of proof are required: (1) a specific intent to obtain or
exercise monopoly power; (2) a dangerous probability of success
in realizing the proscribed goal; and, (3) predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed toward accomplishing that goal. 19
Specific Intent

To establish liability for attempted monopolization, plaintiff
must prove that it was defendant's design or purpose to obtain
power to control prices or exclude competition from the relevant
12. 461 F. Supp. at 415.
13. [d. at 415.
14. [d. at 419.
15. [d. at 418.
16. [d. at 419.
17. [d.
18. 668 F.2d 1014, 1039.
19. See California Computer Prod., Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 613 .
F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1979).
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market segment. 20 More specifically, what is required is an intent to gain this market power through the use of unfair or predatory means. 21 "The mere intention of [defendant] to exclude
competition. . . is insufficient to establish specific intent to monopolize by some illegal means . . . . To conclude otherwise
would contravene the very essence of a competitive marketplace
which is to prevail against all competitors. "1111 Defining specific
intent in terms of some "bad" conduct attempts to distinguish
between legitimate and predatory conduct,lI8 and as such, evidence of that conduct is indispensable. 1I4 Thus, one who specifically intends to acquire the power to control prices or exclude
competitors, but uses a legitimate means such as efficient production, will not be found to have the intent required to satisfy
this element/oil!
Direct evidence of a specific intent to unlawfully acquire
market power is generally rare, and defendant's subjective state
of mind is difficult to prove. 28 For this reason, the specific intent
element may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, principally of a defendant's conduct.lI7 It has been held that such an
inference is proper when the defendant exercises a large degree
20. See Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978) (defendant distilling company not subject to
liability under § 2 for geographical price variations); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327
F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964) (oil company that imposed
exclusive dealing requirements and "tying" arrangement requiring purchase of that company's accessory products upon its dealers subject to liability under §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act).
21. 668 F.2d at 1028. 22. Blair Foods Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir. 1980) (cotton seed oil manufacturer/distributor not subject to liability even where there is direct
evidence of intent, absent some unlawful conduct). Accord Buffalo Courier-Expre88, Inc.
v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 601 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1979); Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d
958, 977 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
23. 668 F.2d 1014, 1028.
24.Id.
25. California Computer, 8upra note 19, at 742; United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S.
563, 571 (1966) (acquisition of monopoly power as a result of a superior product, busine88
acumen, or historical accident, not within the scope of § 2).
26. "[A]vailability of evidence of improper intent is often a function of luck and of
the defendant's legal sophistication, not of the underlying reality." R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW - AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, 1.89-1.90 (1976). "Ordinarily, specific intent is
difficult to prove." Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12 (9th Cir.
1973) (stringent credit terms demanded by defendant resulting in loss of business to
plaintiff motivated by legitimate business concerns, not from a conspiratorial motive;
market power not essential to attempt claim).
27. 668 F.2d 1014, 1027.
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of control over the market,28 or in the absence of significant
market power, where the conduct is "of a kind clearly threatening to competition or clearly exclusionary."29 Some cases seem to
require an actual violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. sO The consensus in the Ninth Circuit seems to endorse the
"clearly threatening" language as the guide to the sort of conduct required to support the inference of specific intent.S!
Dangerous Probability of Success

This element originates in the relationship between the separate offenses of monopolization and attempt to monopolize. S2 It
has been treated as equivalent to significant market power. ss
Some decisions have held that proof of substantial market power
28. See Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra note 20, at 474.
29. Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d at 854 n.4. Accord Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1980); California Computer Prod., Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 613 F.2d at 737; Sherman v.
British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 453 n.47 (9th Cir. 1979); Gough v. Rossmoor
Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 390 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979). See generally
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 134-40 (1977).
30. Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 390 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 936 (1979) (refusal of community newspaper to print plaintiff's advertisements not
per se unreasonable restraint of trade pursuant to Sherman Act); Sherman v. British
Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 453 n.47 (9th Cir. 1979) (automobile manufacturers
refusal to renew franchise contract with distributor pursuant to that contract not conspiracy or attempt to monopolize under the Sherman Act); California Computer Prod. v.
International Business Mach. Corp., 613 F.2d at 737.
31. See Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 925 (9th Cir.
1980) (non-price related activities may support an attempt to monopolize; here, defendant introduced a new product similar to defendant's new product at about the same
time, used similar label and name as plaintiff's new product, and introduced price discounts to correspond to introduction of plaintiff's new product); California Computer
Prod. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 613 F.2d at 737; Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., supra note 30, at 453 n.47; Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., supra note 30,
at 390.
32. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (per Holmes, J.).
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result
which the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monopoly-but require further acts in addition to the mere forces of
nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass
is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that
it will happen. But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute . . . directs itself against
that dangerous probability as well as against the complete
result.
[d. at 396 (citations omitted).
33. Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971) (attempt to monopolize claim requires "specific intent to monopolize, and . . . sufficient
market power to come dangerously close to success.") (emphasis added).
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may serve as direct evidence of a dangerous probability of success,34 and may be relevant circumstantial evidence of specific
intent. 3& However, no particular degree of control over the market is required to prove a dangerous probability of success. 38
Absent direct evidence that defendant's intent to monopolize combined with predatory conduct has a dangerous
probability of bringing about a proscribed end, this element may
be inferred from direct evidence of specific intent plus proof of
conduct,37 or from evidence of conduct alone, provided that it is
the sort of conduct from which specific intent could be inferred. 38 As such, a showing of "predatory" or "anticompetitive"
conduct that is clearly threatening or clearly in restraint of trade
will state the entire claim under section 2 of the Act. 3s
Predatory Conduct

The element of predatory conduct is central to a section 2
attempted monopolization claim. Even where direct evidence of
intent to monopolize and dangerous probability of success are
present, direct evidence of predatory conduct is indispensabIe. 40
The conduct which will support the double inference must
amount to a substantial claim of restraint of trade or be clearly
threatening or exclusionary,·1 and has been described as activity
"without legitimate business purpose."42 More specifically, con34. See California Computer, supra note 19, at 737; Sherman, supra note 29, at 453
n.47; Janich, supra note 20, at 853; Hallmark, supra note 26, at 12.
35. Lessig, supra note 20, at 474.
36. Hallmark, supra note 26, at 12 n.3.
37. Janich, supra note 20, at 853; Hallmark, supra note 25, at 12; Moore v. Jas. H.
Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 1977); Pacific Coast Agricultural Export
Ass'n v. Sun kist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
959 (1976).
38. Hunt- Wesson, supra note 31, at 926; California Computer, supra note 19, at
737; Sherman, supra note 30, at 453 n.47; Janich, supra note 20, at 854; Hallmark,
supra note 26, at 12-13.
39. Direct evidence of intent may permit the court to rely upon a broader range of
predatory conduct, since the purpose of engaging in such conduct may be more clearly
understood as predatory, even though such conduct taken alone would not clearly indicate predation or support an inference of specific intent. 668 F.2d 1014, 1030.
40. [d.
41. See supra note 39.
42. Chisholm Bros. Farm Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 498 F.2d 1137,
1145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 932 (1974) (liquidation of obsolete or used equipment to free t:p capital and avoid interest costs a legitimate business tactic despite short
term loss); Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453, 457 (W.O.
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duct is predatory if the advantage to the actor is "dependent
upon its tendency to discipline or eliminate competition; and
thereby enhance the firm's long term ability to reap the benefits
of monopoly power."43
"Pricing is predatory when a firm forgoes short term profits
in order to develop a market position such that the firm can
later raise prices and recoup lost profits . . . . "44 While such a
statement captures the spirit of the distinction between valued
competitive conduct and proscribed anticompetitive conduct,
there are economic tests that are more specific and helpful in
determining whether a particular pricing policy is predatory
within the meaning of the Act.
Professors Areeda and TurnerU suggest that a price should
not be considered predatory if it is at, or above, the firm's marginal cost of production (MC). Marginal cost is that incremental
increase in production costs associated with producing the last
unit of production. 46 This is so because short run economic welfare is increased as the price is lowered toward the marginal cost
of production, and maximized where price exactly equals MC.4?
Pa. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969) (Chrysler subsidized unprofitable company stores in order to sell cars at a loss; held-not a legitimate business
purpose).
43. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Areeda & Turner) (endorsing the use of average variable cost to determine if pricing is predatory).
44. Janich, supra note 20, at 856; Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977) (Independent gasoline distributor sued
Shell Oil Company for attempted monopolization. The court affirmed a directed verdict
for defendant for lack of proof of below AVC or MC pricing).
45. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 711.
46. [d. at 700.
47. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 15-19
(1970). Janich noted:
In economic analysis, the marginal cost of a good is construed
as the cost to society of that good, for its production requires
resources which could be used in the production of other
goods. The price which people are willing to pay to obtain the
good is construed as the social value of the good . . . . As
prices decline more people are willing to buy. For a firm to sell
more goods, prices must be reduced.
As a matter of short-run economic welfare, it is beneficial
to increase production and lower prices so long as price exceeds marginal cost: In other words, so long as there are people who are willing to pay an amount for the good which is
above its marginal cost, it is socially beneficial to continue to

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

25

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 6

72

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:65

As such, any rule of law that would penalize a firm for selling at
MC would burden the efficient allocation of resources among alternative uses, at the expense of society.48
It is when prices are set below MC that they become suspect
since, the seller is, by definition, incurring an out-of-pocket
"loss" for each additional unit it sells. 49 The firm can continue to
do so as long as it has cash reserves to support such losses. Such
conduct may have the effect of expelling or excluding competitors from the market for reasons unrelated to their relative
efficiencies. llo

The problem with MC as the standard by which predation
is judged is that such a cost figure is not readily calculated from
standard business records, and is somewhat difficult to prove
with certainty. III Areeda and Turner thus suggest the use of average variable cost (A VC) as an evidentiary surrogate for MC.1I2
Average variable cost is the total of costs that vary with the level
of output, divided (averaged) by the number of units produced. 1I3
Typical of such costs are material and labor. Fixed costs, on the
other hand, are those expenditures that do not vary over the relevant range of production. Capital costs, plant facilities, and machinery are examples of non-varying costs; characteristic of such
costs is that they will be incurred even if production is ceased. 1I4
increase production. Of course this will require a continued reduction in prices in order to sell the full amount produced.
Thus, social welfare is maximized in the short run . . . where
the price of the good equals its marginal cost.
570 F.2d 848, 857 n.9.
48. In California Computer, the Ninth Circuit found:
The thrust of this analysis is that price reductions up to the
point of marginal cost are consistent with competition on the
merits, since in this case only less efficient firms will be disadvantaged, while a firm pricing below marginal cost by definition incurs losses, so that competition on the basis of efficiency
in this situation is frustrated.
613 F.2d 727, 743.
49.Id.
50. Janich, supra note 20, at 858.
51. Hanson, supra note 44, at 1358; Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 700 n.13,
716-17 & n.42.
52. Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 717. The authors argue that even where the
two cost measures diverge, AVC is the proper measure of cost, since pricing below AVC
will so rarely be loss minimizing. Id.
53. Id. at 700.
54. Janich, supra note 20, at 858.
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For example, a firm must continue to make payments on its machinery even if it is not using it to produce its product.
Average total cost is the sum of all fixed and variable costs
divided by the number of units produced. 1I1I Typically, a firm will
desire to sell its product at or above this average total cost
(ATC), thereby recovering all costs of production, including a
reasonable return in invested capital.
It is against this economic and legal background that the
Ninth Circuit panel was called upon to review the grant of
JNOV and determine whether plaintiff had effectively demonstrated predatory pricing.
C.

THE COURT'S REASONING

The Court's Approach to Establishing Predation
The Inglis court held that a showing of below AVC pricing
could in fact support the double inference of specific intent and
dangerous probability, and state a prima facie case of attempted
monopolization. 1I6 It reasoned that although defendant had
priced its product below its ATC, this, taken alone, would not
prove that the conduct was predatory.1I7 Such a finding may,
however, lead a jury to conclude that the benefit of such conduct
was an improved market position whereby short term losses
could be recouped. The court found that the reason below ATC
pricing is not presumptively predatory is that such a pricing policy may be an effective means to minimize losses when the firm
is experiencing temporary excess capacity or a decrease in the
demand for its product. 1I8 When the firm is recovering a price
below its ATC, but above its AVC, it is recovering all of its variable costs associated with continued production, and at least a
portion of its fixed costs that would be incurred even if production were to cease. 1I9 Therefore, it would cost the firm more to
shut down than it would to continue production at a "loss" because it would no longer be recovering that portion of fixed costs
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 700..
668 F.2d 1014, 1041.
[d. at 1035.
[d. at 1035 n.32.
[d. at 1035.
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that are, by definition, incllrred even if it shuts down. 60
The court did not suggest that a showing of prices below
ATe will conclusively determine that the conduct was predatory.6t Predation will be found when "the justification of these
prices is based, not on their effectiveness in minimizing losses,
but on their tendency to eliminate rivals and create a market
structure enabling the seller to recoup his 10sses."82
However, the Inglis court found that prices below AVe do
not warrant the benefit of the doubt extended to prices above
Ave, because the former are less likely to be motivated by some
legitimate business purpose. 6S At this price level, not only is the
firm not recovering a portion of its fixed costs, but it is also losing a portion of the additional cost associated with continued
production. The court reasoned that if the firm is forced by the
market to accept this price for its product, "[t)he economic case
for discontinuance of production is strong. "64 If the firm remains
in production at a loss under these circumstances, it is highly
probable that doing so is part of a scheme to eventually reap illgotten gains; therefore, the benefit of the doubt will go to plaintiff rather than defendant.
After Inglis, a showing of prices below AVe will establish a
prima facie case of predatory pricing, and the burden will shift
to defendant to prove that the prices were justified without regard to any anticipated destructive effect they might have on
competitors. ell Moreover, the court emphasized that its decision
was aimed not merely at endorsing the below Ave standard as
an acceptable means of proof of predation, but also at "eschew[ing) dogmatic adherence to a particular, rigid test and to
fashion broad and flexible objective standards concerned with
accurately evaluating the purposes of business behavior."" The
ultimate standard remains the same: did the justification for the
pricing policy depend upon anticipated disruption and exclusion
6O.ld.
6l. Id.
62.ld.
63.ld.
64.ld.
65. Id. at 1036.
66. Id. at 1031 n.1S.
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of competitors such that defendant could recoup short term
losses from its enhanced market position. 87
Determination of Fixed and Variable Costs

The Inglis court held that the cost categories previously
enumerated by the Ninth Circuit88 were "illustrative . . . not
prescriptive,"89 and that determination of which costs are fixed
and which are variable will change from case to case. 70 As such,
the categorization of fixed and variable costs, and the determination of AVC, must be made on an individual case basis.
The first step in such a determination is to compare the
"cost of production before and after the price reduction. The variable cost would . . . be those expenses that increased as a result of the output expansion attributable to the price reduction."7l Utilizing this approach, the court avoided the problems
of misclassifying as fixed costs those that are in fact variable, or
as variable costs those which are actually fixed, during the relevant time period. 72
. The court then reemphasized that these cost categories are
not an end in themselves, but rather "solely for the purpose of
. . . answering the ultimate question: Did the justification for
the defendant's price depend upon its anticipated destructive effect on competition or was the price justified as a reasonably calculated means of. . . minimizing losses, or achieving some other
legitimate business end?"78 The court therefore held that the
determination of fixed and variable costs, hence, the determination of AVC, is a matter for the jury with appropriate
instructions. 74
The Dissents

In addition to the dissent from the majority's decision by
Judge Peck, Judge Wallace filed a dissent from the decision to
67. [d. at 1038.

68. Janich, supra note 20, at 858.
69. 668 F.2d at 1037.
70. [d. at 1038.
71. [d. at 1037.
72. [d.
73. [d. at 1038.
74. [d.
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deny rehearing en banco To some extent, their contentions and
objections overlap, and where applicable, will be discussed
simultaneously.
First, both dissenting judges felt that allowing the double
inference of specific intent alid dangerous probability was a departure from the rule that these inferences are proper only if the
conduct was clearly threatening or exclusionary.71~
Second, both judges attacked the majority's depiction of the
relative roles of judge and jury in attempted monopolization litigation. Judge Peck stated that the concept of variable cost is
difficult enough for experts and legal specialists to define, and
may simply confuse a jury of lay persons. 76 Leaving this determination to the jury with appropriate instructions would open the
way for jurors to "infer pricing below average variable costs from
the jurors' preliminary view of the predatory nature of the defendant's conduct, instead of vice-versa."77 Judge Wallace objected to allowing the jury to determine AVC for this reason, but
noted that because this is now a matter for the jury, trial judges
will be prevented from ever taking a case from the jury and disposing of unmeritorous suits in the early stages of triaP8
Judge Wallace's dissent stated his more basic disagreement
with the majority. His reading of recent Ninth Circuit precedent
was that a showing of below MC or AVC pricing was a prerequisite to a predatory pricing claim. 711 His dissent observed that the
majority's opinion, in recognizing the broad subjective rule that
prices will be predatory depending upon the anticipated benefit,
abandoned the MC rule and substituted in its place "a subjective and amorphous test involving a shifting burden of proof
which leaves to the jury . . . decisional authority on attempted
monopolization claims. "60 This leaves open the possibility that
plaintiffs may state a prima facie case without even alleging below MC or AVC prices. Although Judge Wallace recognized the
validity of exceptions to the requirement that prices be set be75. [d. at
76. [d. at
77. [d.
78. [d. at
79. [d. at
SO. [d. at

1059 (Peck, J., di88enting); id. at 1060 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
1059.
1064.
1062.

1060.
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low MC or AVC,sl, he reasoned that the majority's decision went
too far, and endorsing the MC rule and its exceptions would
have provided a more consistent and workable approach. S2
D.

ANALYSIS

Under Inglis, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
upon plaintiff's showing that defendant engaged in below AVC
or MC pricing. Perhaps more significantly, plaintiffs may more
often have their cases decided by the jury in light of the recognition that prices above AVC, but below ATC, may be predatory.
This is an apparent expansion of the type of conduct that will
support a claim of attempted monopolization. Notwithstanding
the dissents' claim that the holding is a departure from precedent, it may be justified as reconcilable with precedent, and a
wise policy choice.
.
All of the cases relied upon by the dissents as requiring a
showing of below AVC or MC contain qualifying language,S3 or
can be distinguished on their facts. S. Moreover, it had previously
81. [d. at 1062.
82. [d. at 1063. Of particular concern to Judge Wallace was the recent decision in
Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841 (N.D.
Cal. 1979). There, a JNOV was entered against plaintiff for failure to allege prices below
AVC or MC. Defendant provided ship assisting services and piloting by an agreement
with his employees; defendant provided this package of services for less than they otherwise might have been provided. It was apparent that defendant's prices exceeded average
variable cost, exceeded the prices charged by plaintiff, and even produced a net profit.
467 F. Supp. at 861 n.16.
83. See Hanson, supra note 44, at 1358-59. The court recognized below MC or AVC
pricing as a prerequisite to a prima facie case of predation, but also recognized two exceptions to the rule: some prices below MC may have a legitimate business reason, and
prices above AVC or MC could be predatory if they were below its short run profit maximizing price and there were significant barriers to entry of the market. See also Janich,
supra note 20, at 857 ("an across-the-board price set at or above marginal cost should
not ordinarily form the basis for an antitrust violation.") (emphasis added); California
Computer, supra note 19, at 740 n.19 (plaintiff failed to prove prices below MC or AVC,
"which ordinarily is required to show predatory pricing.").
84. Murphy Tugboat, supra note 82. The majority read that case as alleging "nothing more than the fact that the agreement between defendant and its employees left
defendant's prices lower than they otherwise might have been. The holding that such an
allegation cannot establish an unreasonable restraint of trade . . . certainly does not
foreclose the inquiry which we have undertaken here." 668 F.2d at 1034 n.27. That inquiry, specifically, was whether a case of predatory pricing "can ever be established without proof of pricing below marginal or average variable cost." [d.
In Pierce Packing Co. v. John Morren & Co., 633 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1980), plaintiff
. was precluded from raising the question of above AVC or MC prices as predatory when
they are below short term profit maximization and significant barriers to entry exist, due
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been recognized that the original Me rule would require refinement as future cases arose.811
Even were the Inglis decision an actual departure from precedent, it may be justified from an antitrust policy perspective.
The dissents feared that complete authority would be vested in
the jury, and trial judges would be precluded from taking the
decision from the jury. According to Judge Wallace, this is unsound policy for it will reduce the ability of trial judges to dismiss unmeritorious suits in times of "burgeoning anti-trust litigation"88 and consequently burden the district courts. While
more cases may get to the jury because conduct that would support a claim now includes all pricing below ATe, it may be that
these cases will be offset by those taken from the jury as a result
of the shifting burden of proof.
Another policy consideration that lends support to the rule
announced by the majority is the nature of capital intensive antitrust defendants such as larger steel or auto manufacturers. In
these and other areas, variable cost may represent a relatively
small percentage of ATe, making the possibility that any given
manufacturer will price below its AVe very slight. Plaintiffs engaged in this type of suit will be less likely to incur a directed
verdict or JNOV, but will not be afforded the benefit of a shift
in the burden of proof, and will be left to other means to show
that the benefit of the conduct was dependent upon an enhanced market position and recoupment of short term losses.
The majority also held that the determination of fixed and
variable costs are a matter for the jury despite the recommendation by Areeda and Turner8" that arbitrary cost categories be
maintained. Although this rule sacrifices to some extent the ease
of administration'of the AVe rule, it is consistent with the majority's attempt to "eschew dogmatic adherence to a particular,
rigid test. "88
Some increases in production may require a commensurate
to its failure to raise the objection to the jury instructions at trial. Id. at 1033 n.27.
85. California Computer, supra note 19, at 743.
86. Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1063.
87. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ~ 715c, at 173-74 (1978).
88. 668 F.2d at 1031 n.18.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/6

32

McConnell: Antitrust Law

80

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:79

that a complaint alleging that the state bar committed an antitrust violation in its grading of a bar examination stated a cause
of action.
Plaintiff took the Arizona bar examination in February
1974. Two months later he was informed that he had failed. 2
Plaintiff then filed an antitrust action against the State Bar of
Arizona, the State Bar Committee on Examinations and Admissions, and the members of the Committee, alleging that the Bar
illegally restricted competition among attorneys practicing in
Arizona by limiting the number of attorneys who receive a passing grade on the bar exam.
Plaintiff's specific complaint was that the Bar did not grade
on the indicated zero to one hundred scale, but instead used a
"raw score" system. Plaintiff alleged that the Bar determined
the number of attorneys to be admitted, then set the passing
score accordingly. He contended that this method of grading resulted in the arbitrary exclusion of himself and others from the
practice of law and thus unlawfully restrained trade by reducing
the number of competing attorneys. On appeal from a dismissal,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the
Bar enjoyed absolute immunity under antitrust laws3 and that
jurisdictional requirements were unsatisfied. 4
The Ninth Circuit's decision not to immunize the state bar
from the antitrust laws symbolizes its increasing willingness to
apply the Sherman Antitrust Act whenever concerted conduct
restrains trade, regardless of the identity of the defendant or the
laudable purposes asserted. This note will explore the basis for
the court's decision and discuss its significance in terms of what
2. Plaintiff's petitions for review by the Arizona Supreme Court and for certiorari by
the Supreme Court were denied. Ronwin v. Committee on Examinations & Admissions,
419 U.S. 967 (1974). Plaintiff' was denied permission to retake the bar examination because the Arizona State Bar found that he was "mentally and physically unable to engage in active and continuous practice of law." The finding was affirmed by the Arizona
Supreme Court in Application of Ronwin, 113 Ariz. 357, 555 P.2d 315 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977).
3. The amended opinion reversed the decision to dismiss as to the individual committee members. Because no specific allegations of wrongdoing were made against the
Bar, the dismissal for failure to state a claim was proper as to the Bar. 686 F.2d at 694
n.l.

4. Plaintiff' also moved for recusal of the judge. Denial of that motion was affirmed
on appeal. 686 F.2d at 700-01.
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can be justified as a necessary regulation of the legal profession.
B.

BACKGROUND

The State Action Exemption
The advent of industrialization, and the vast accumulation
of wealth that accompanied it, necessitated statutory law to both
preserve the tradition of free economic competition and ensure
equality of opportunity to actual and potential competitors. II
The Sherman Antitrust ActS was intended to stimulate competition by prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade and monopolization. 7 One of the few judicially created exemptions to the
Sherman Act is the "state action" exemption, which absolves the
sovereign actions of a state or its agencies from antitrust liability. Although the principle underlying this exemption emerged
shortly after passage of the Act,S the state action immunity doctrine was not enunciated until 1943 in Parker v. Brown. 9 In
Parker, the Supreme Court held that a state statute authorizing
a marketing program which allegedly restrained competition was
not within the intended scope of the Sherman Act. 10 Examining
the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the Court concluded
that the Act prohibited "business combinations" but not official
acts of government undertaken by a state in its sovereign
capacity. 11
5. The monopolistic tendencies of "trusts" and "combinations" of business and of
capital organized and directed "to control the market by supression of competition in the
marketing of goods and services became a matter of public concern." Apex Hosiery v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1940).
6. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise; or conspiracy in the restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared
to be illegal . . . ."
7. The end sought by the Act was the prevention of restraints on free competition in
business and commercial transactions which tend to restrict production, raise prices or
otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and
services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury. 310 U.S.
at 493.
8. The principle was suggested but not fully explored in Lowenstein v. Evan, 69 F.
908 (4th Cir. 1885).
9. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
10. In Parker, a raisin producer-packer challenged a state program designed to restrict competition among growers and thereby stabilize prices in the raisin market. The
Court held that the state "as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government
which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit." [d. at 352.
11. [d. at 350-5l.
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Thirty two years following Parker, the potential reach of
the state action doctrine was narrowed in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar. III The Court held that action merely authorized by
the state was outside the state action exemption. IS The state,
acting in its sovereign capacity, must compel the engaging in anticompetitive activities to warrant application of the Parker
exemption. U
The Goldfarb compulsion requirement was affirmed in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. III The Court deemed it significant
to consider whether the particular state policy was clearly and
affirmatively expressed and whether the state was active in supervising the policy's implementation. I8
The Court in City of Lafayette u. Louisiana Power & Light
Co.n and California Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum I8 announced a definitive two step test to establish Parker state action immunity. First, anticompetitive activities are exempt from
antitrust laws when they are "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy." Second, the functioning of the
policy must be actively supervised by the state itself. IS Midcal
12. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Goldfarb, plaintiffs contracting to buy a home were required to obtain title insurance, which necessitated a title examination that could be
legally performed only by a member of the Virginia State Bar. Plaintiffs could not find a
lawyer willing to charge a fee lower than the schedule dictated. Id. at 776. In a suit
alleging price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, the Court held that the Bar was not
immune from antitrust laws and that the minimum fee schedule illegally restrained competition among attorneys practicing in the state. Id. at 791-93.
13. The defendant State Bar maintained that its actions were "prompted" by a
state agency. The Court found no state law requiring defendant's activities and ruled
that a mere "prompting" was insufficient to satisfy exemption under the Parker doctrine. 421 U.S. at 790-91.
14. Id. at 791.
15. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
16. Id. at 362. The Bate8 Court held that a state supreme court disciplinary rule
prohibiting advertisements by attorneys reflected a clear articulation of the state's policy
with regard to profeBSionai behavior sufficient to compel compliance. Moreover, the state
supervision was active as the rule was subject to pointed reexamination by the policy
maker, the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. at 359-63.
17. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
18. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
19. Midcal, 435 U.S. at 410; Lafayette, 445 U.S. at 105. The Midcal Court held that
California's resale price maintenance and price posting statutes for the wholesale wine
trade were not shielded by the state action exemption. As there existed no special antitrust immunity, the wine pricing system, "designed to maintain prices ... and to prevent competition among those who traded in [competing goods]" violated the Sherman
Act. 445 U.S. at 102-03, quoting Doctor Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
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emphasized that the national policy in favor of competition
mandates that both requirements of the test be met. 20
Both Midcal and Lafayette noted that "antitrust laws in
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."n Midcal urged recognition of the importance of the
Sherman Act's pro-competition policy22 as representing the fundamental principle governing commerce in the country.23
The Learned Profession Exemption

Another exemption emerged from a judicial recognition of a
limited exclusion of "learned professions" from the scope of antitrust laws.24 The legislative history of the Sherman Act211 contains no reference to the Act's applicability to those areas likely
to be incompatible with the "trade or commerce" limitation,
such as law, medicine or other learned professions. 28
In Goldfarb the Supreme Court denied that the learned
professions are entitled to an absolute exemption from antitrust
laws but indicated the possibility that they might receive some
220 U.S. 373, 407 (1911).
20. In Midcal, the state policy was clear in its purpose to maintain prices. But the
state did not establish or regulate the price schedules, nor did it review their reasonableness. The Court stated that the "national policy in favor of competition cannot be
thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a
private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U.S. at 106.
21. 445 U.S. at 110; 435 U.S. at 398 n.16, quoting United States v. Topco Ass'n, Inc.
405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
22. 445 U.S. at 111.
23. 435 U.S. at 398.
24. This exclusion is based upon the special form of regulation imposed upon the
professions by the states and the incompatibility of certain competitive practices with
such professional regulation. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 779-80.
25. See Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 31C U.S. 469, 489 (1940); Standard Oil v. United
States, 221 U.S. I, 50 (1911).
26. However, it is generally agreed that CongreBB used the language "trade or commerce" for a specific reason unrelated to intending an autonomous restriction on the
Act's purview. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 490. The Supreme Court has stated that
" 'trade or commerce' covers any occupation, employment or busineBB ... carried on for
the purpose of profit or gain." United States v. National ABB'n of Real Estate Boards,
339 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1950).
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special treatment.27 The Court did not articulate the nature of
this special treatment but did emphasize the interests of the
states in regulating such professions. 28 Consequently, lower
courts faced with formulating a more precise definition of the
learned professions exemption have often relied on the related
state action exemption. 29
Jurisdictional Requirement

The Sherman Act deals in terms of restraints of trade or
commerce "among the several states."so If there is no restraint of
interstate commerce, there is no violation of the Sherman Act.
The jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman Act may be satisfied by proving that (1) the activities in question are actually "in
interstate commerce" or (2) if the activities are local in nature,
they substantially "affect" interstate commerce. S }
The leading Supreme Court decision applying the "in commerce" test is Goldfarb. S2 There, the Court approached the jurisdictional issue in a practical sense, stressing that legal services
were coincidental with commercial intercourse and in terms of
27. In an oft quoted footnote, the Court stated that:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining
whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically
to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated
in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of
the professions, may require that a particular practice, which
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view
on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17.
28. 421 U.S. at 792-93.
29. See State of Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 643 F.2d 553, 556
(9th Cir. 1980); Feminist Woman's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). See generally Bauer, Professional Activities
and the Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 570 (1975).
30. See supra note 6.
31. McLain v. Real Estate Board Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980).
32. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Goldfarb, the Court found jurisdiction, noting that in
terms of restraining competition and harming consumers, the price fixing of title examination searches was unusually damaging. A title examination was indispensable in the
process of financing a realty purchase, and because only a licensed attorney could legally
examine title, consumers could not turn to alternative sources. 1d. at 782.
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commercial continuity, they were essential. 88 The Court therefore concluded that because lawyers play an integral role in commercial intercourse, anticompetitive activities by lawyers may
exert a restraint on commerce. M
In McLain v. Real Estate Board Inc.,81'> the Court addressed
the alternative "effect on commerce" test. To invoke jurisdiction
under this test the existence of a demonstrable nexus between
the defendant's activity and the restraint of interstate commerce
must be established. 8s It is the unreasonableness of the restraint
and its effect on interstate commerce and not the amount of
commerce which establishes the causal connection necessary to
assert an antitrust violation. 87 McLain also adopted a pragmatic
approach in holding that "as a matter of practical economics"
the challenged activity had a substantial effect on the interstate
commerce involved. 88
C.

THE COURT'S REASONING

1. The Majority

Antitrust Immunity

The Ninth Circuit in Ronwin relied on the two step test
enunciated in Midcal to conclude that the challenged grading
procedure failed to warrant antitrust immunity. First, like the
bar association in Goldfarb, the Arizona Bar had no statute or
Supreme Court rule that required the grading procedure. Second, the general delegation of duty by the Arizona Supreme
Court to the Bar for examining applicants to determine whether
they had the "necessary qualifications" did not compel the Bar
to implement its grading procedure. 89
As the Court stated in Goldfarb, the threshold inquiry in
determining if an anticompetitive activity is immune from antitrust laws is whether the activity is required by the state acting
33. [d. at 783·84.
34. [d. at 785.
35. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
36. [d. at 246.
37. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947).
38. 444 U.S. at 246. In McLain, a price fixing conspiracy between real estate brokers
was found to affect both the frequency and terms of residential sales transactions because of an inextricable dependancy on interstate financing. [d.
39. 686 F.2d 692, 696.
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as a sovereign. 40 Thus, the Ronwin court focused on whether the
state, acting through the Arizona Supreme Court, had an active
hand in formulating and regulating the grading procedure. Finding Bates distinguishable on its facts from those in Ronwin, the
court found that the state bar acted independently and without
any active supervision by the state policy maker, the Arizona
Supreme Court. There was no state policy, clearly articulated or
otherwise, stipulating how bar exams were to be graded. 41
The court further found that its conclusion was not inconsistent with the prior Ninth Circuit decisions in Hackin v. Lockwood,42 Chaney v. State Bar of California,43 and Brown v. Board
of Bar Examiners. 44 While all three cases involved challenges to
bar grading procedures, such claims were based on constitutional, not antitrust principles. Hackin held that the Arizona
state bar was an improper defendant because it was not responsible for promulgating or changing the rules governing admission
to practice law.411 In Ronwin however, there existed no rule governing bar grading procedure.
In Brown, a challenge to a requirement that bar applicants
graduate from accredited law schools, the court held that no
subject matter jurisdiction existed. 46 But the jurisdictionallimitation stemmed from the express language of the constitutional
provision relied upon, not because plaintiff was challenging a bar
admission policy. The majority in Ronwin relied on the Goldfarb
decision, that a minimum fee schedule enforced by the state bar
violates section one of the Sherman Act, to conclude that plain40. 421 U.S. at 790.
41. Id. at 696.
42. 361 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1966).
43. 386 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1967).
44. 623 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1980).
45. 361 F.2d at 500-01. Plaintiff, a graduate of an unaccredited law school could not
take the bar because a state rule allowed only graduates of accredited law schools to take
the exam. Id. at 500. Plaintiff's suit against the State Bar of Arizona was held improper
because the accreditation rule was directly promulgated and enforced by the state supreme court. Id. at 500-01.
46. In Brown, the district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to allow plaintiff, a graduate of an unaccredited law school, to take the bar exam
despite a Nevada Supreme Court rule requiring applicants to be graduates of accredited
law schools. The court of appeals held that plaintiff failed to meet jurisdictional requirements as she presented a complaint of individual constitutional deprivation and sought
only individual redress. An attack on the overall administration of the accreditation rule
would have been cognizable in district court. 623 F.2d at 610.
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tiff's complaint established jurisdiction under federal antitrust
laws. 47
In Chaney, the Ninth Circuit stated that the requirement
that bar applicants pass an examination in essay form did not
involve any issue of constitutional substance" s The Ronwin majority found no inconsistency between its holding and that in
Chaney because Chaney clearly concerned the finality and nature of the plaintiffs's claim and bore no relevance to the issues
of state action or proper parties. 49
The majority then found that assuming the Bar was actively
supervised by the Arizona Supreme Court, that factor alone
would be insufficient to justify applying the state action exemption. lIo The national policy in favor of competition should not be
thwarted absent a clear articulation by the Arizona Supreme
Court that it had adopted a policy of limiting the number of
attorneys admitted each year to the Arizona Bar. lIl Without such
a declaration of regulatory purpose, the court held that plaintiff
must be given an opportunity to prove that the Bar policy was
designed to limit the number of attorneys as opposed to insuring
that attorneys have the "necessary qualifications" to practice
law. 1I2

Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act
Having concluded that the Bar was not immune from antitrust action, the majority reasoned that on remand, plaintiff
might meet the jurisdictional requirements by establishing that
the grading procedure evidenced a demonstrable nexus with restraint of interstate commerce. 1I8 Plaintiff argued that because
47. 686 F.2d at 698 n.6.
48. In Chaney, plaintiff, a law school graduate, twice failed the California bar exam.
Although he was eligible to take the exam a third time, he chose to sue the state bar
alleging that its use of hypothetical fact problems requiring essay answers deprived him
of his constitutional rights. 386 F.2d at 963. In affirming dismiBSal of the complaint, the
court stated that the existence of the admi88ion qualification had a rational connection
with the capacity to practice law, for it inherently involved a primary basis of general
legal service. [d. at 964.
49. 686 F.2d at 698 n.6.
50. Ct. California Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105.
51. 686 F.2d at 698.
52. [d. at 698.
53. [d. at 699.
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the services of Arizona lawyers were required by people living
outside Arizona, denial of admission to the bar was not a matter
confined to state lines. Because the Bar's grading procedure artificially limited the number of lawyers admitted to practice in
Arizona, the price paid by out-of-state clients for legal services
performed by Arizona lawyers was higher than if the number of
lawyers was not restricted.1i4
The majority concluded that plaintiff could establish jurisdiction under either the "in commerce" or the "effect on commerce" test. Although plaintiff did not specifically state which
interstate transactions require legal services nor indicate how
substantial an effect on interstate commerce results from limiting the number of lawyers, the majority predicted that if he
could conceivably establish that legal services constitute an indispensable and inseparable component of certain interstate
transactions, the "in commerce" test could be met.1i1i Similarly,
plaintiff did not allege that there were an appreciable number of
interstate transactions taking place in Arizona or that limiting
the number of lawyers had a substantial effect on the number
and size of the transactions. However, the majority stated that if
he could substantiate the impact of the grading procedure, jurisdiction could be established under the "effect on commerce"
test.1i6

2.

The Dissent

The dissent contended that the precedents established in
Hackin, Brown and Chaney mandated that the proper defendant in an action challenging a state bar's grading procedures is
the state supreme court. Because plaintiff complained of the
failure of the supreme court to admit him, and admission to the
bar is within the province of the supreme court, not the state
bar, the dissent concluded that the supreme court was the
proper defendant.1i7
Furthermore, the dissent accused the majority of creating
an antitrust cause of action where the only appropriate chal54.Id.
55.Id.
56.Id.
57. Id. at 702.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

41

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 6

1983]

ANTITRUST LAW

89

lenge was a constitutional one. The dissent interpreted Brown as
holding that because bar admission procedures are purely a matter of local concern, the only constraints on the state's exclusive
jurisdiction are constitutional in nature. &8
The dissent also charged that the majority disregarded the
tradition of deference to state discretion in admission procedures. Because such deference never existed toward the state's
ability to regulate fees, the majority's reliance on Goldfarb was
misplaced. The majority applied erroneous standards to determine whether a state agency was exempt from antitrust laws.
The dissent regarded the regulation of bar admissions as an integral governmental function. &9 For that reason, the Arizona Supreme Court oversees bar admissions and delegates authority to
examine the fitness and competence of bar applicants. 8o Therefore, the dissent concluded that the state supreme court had
merely entrusted the grading of examinations to the bar. The
dissent found that the court incorrectly distinguished Bates by
concluding that the state bar, as opposed to the supreme court,
was committing the alleged anticompetitive act, and that there
was no clearly articulated policy regarding grading procedures.
The dissent attacked the first characterization by asserting
that the Ninth Circuit had thrice reiterated81 that the state supreme court is the proper party when grading procedures are
challenged. 82 The second characterization was unfounded as the
two step Midcal test was met. The Arizona Supreme Court authorized the Bar to grade examinations, but the Bar acted as a
mere instrumentality of the court. The state supreme court itself
ultimately approved every bar application. By approving the
challenged procedures of accepting recommendations for admissions based on those procedures, the state impliedly validated
the Bar's grading system. 83 This implied validation rendered
Bates rather than Goldfarb more directly analogous to Ronwin. 84
58. [d. at 703.
59. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 424.

60. The dissent maintained that if the state's agents abuse their authority, the
proper remedy is not an antitrust but a constitutional attack. 686 F.2d at 703-04.
61. See Hackin, supra note 42; Chaney, supra note 43; Brown, supra note 44.
62. 686 F.2d at 703.
63. [d. at 707.
64. In Goldfarb, the alleged anticompetitive activity was the promulgation of a fee
schedule by the state bar. The Court found the state bar was not immune because this
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In Ronwin, the challenged activity was the grading of examinations on a curve. The alleged anticompetitive result of artificially
limiting the number of attorneys was to monopolize. The dissent
concluded that the majority erroneously subjected the state bar
to antitrust laws by focusing on the alleged result and ignoring
the immunity issue decided in Bates. 611
The dissent contended that the Supreme Court's decision in
Community Communications Co., Inc. u. City of Boulder,66 although involving an action by a city, supported conferring antitrust immunity to the Arizona State Bar. In City of Boulder, the
Court held that the state's "mere neutrality" toward municipal
actions was not a clear articulation of state policy. The actions
of the municipalities were not "comprehended within the powers
granted," since the term "granted" necessarily implies an affirmative addressing of the subject by the state. 67 In no way had the
Arizona Supreme Court taken a position of "neutrality" allowing
the Bar to do as it pleased. To the contrary, it had affirmatively
addressed the grading of exams by granting to the Bar the power
to examine applicants and recommend admission of those
qualified. 88
As to the issue of jurisdiction, the dissent attacked the fact
that plaintiff's complaint neither identified a relevant market
nor alleged a substantial impact on such a market. 69 The dissent
contended that as there was no possibility that he might prove
substantial impact, plaintiff did not warrant an opportunity to
demonstrate the elements of his case. 70
illegal price fixing waa expressly disclaimed by the state supreme court. 421 U.S. at 781.
Bates, on the other hand, concerned a prohibition against advertising. The alleged result
waa to monopolize. The defendant bar association waa held to be immune because the
state supreme court itself promulgated the rule. 433 U.S. at 362.
65. 686 F.2d at 707.

66. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
67. ld. at 843 (emphaais in original).

68. Ronwin, 686 F.2d at 707.
69. ld. at 708.

70. The dissent concluded that on the facts of the caae, plaintiff could not establish
that the curved grading system had more than a trivial impact on interstate commerce.
The ability of applicants to reapply permits them to remain within the potential stream
of commerce. ld.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

43

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 6

1983]

D.

ANTITRUST LAW

91

SIGNIFICANCE

The Supreme Court in Goldfarb stated that the threshold
inquiry in determining if anticompetitive activity is state action,
outside the purview of the Sherman Act, is whether that activity
is required by the state acting as sovereign. But this is only the
first, not the final step of inquiry.71 The very word "threshold"
suggests that something more than a sovereign command may be
necessary to invoke state action immunity.
Goldfarb acknowledged that the interest of the state in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to
the primary governmental function of administering justice and
have historically been "officers of the Courts."7! Restricting the
practice of law to persons licensed by the state is both a legitimate and necessary exercise of the state's inherent regulatory
power. 7S The regulatory purpose is to further the primary duty
for which the profession exists: to serve the public. 74 By both
insuring that persons rendering legal services are qualified to do
so' and imposing upon lawyers a degree of accountability to the
state, the regulatory purpose is served. 76

But in order for a particular regulation to survive a Sherman Act challenge, it must contribute directly to improving service to the public. That which only suppresses competition between practioners will fail the challenge. This interpretation
permits a harmonization of the ends that both the profession
and the Sherman Act serve.
The dissent correctly reiterated this principle but failed to
recognize that the issue in Ronwin was how the state action exemption should be applied to the regulation of admission into
the legal profession. The significance of the Ronwin decision is
71. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 425.
72. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 792. The Goldfarb Court found that
states have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries,
and as part of their power to protect public health, safety and other valid interests, they
have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the
practice of professions. [d.
73. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc., v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298, 307 (E.D.
Virgo 1977), vacated, 571 F.2d 205 (1978).
74. Boddicker V. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied., 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
75. 549 F.2d at 632.
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the court's focus on the relationship between the anticompetitive activity and the regulatory purpose to be met. This focus
may well be used to confront the "special treatment" dilemma
left by Goldfarb 78 and to implement a more realistic approach to
the legality of professional regulation.
The Supreme Court has stated that a state may not immu- .
nize anti competitive activity from antitrust laws merely by authorizing it.77 The Ronwin majority accordingly questioned
whether a subsequent Arizona Supreme Court rule requiring a
"proposed formula" for grading bar examinations would necessarily afford state action immunity.78
Under Goldfarb, the relevant inquiry would be whether
there is any "public service aspect" or any "other feature" of the
legal profession which justifies anticompetitive activity.79 The
Ronwin court however, by emphasizing the national policy in
favor of competition, subjected professional regulation to the
same legal analysis as similar conduct by those engaged in
purely commercial enterprises. 80 The court focused on the nexus
between the grading procedure and the professional duty of
public service. Recognizing that this link was tenuous, the majority concluded that the state action exemption did not apply.
The dissent manifested the tenuousness of this relationship
by asserting that the state "impliedly validated" the Bar's grading procedure. An implied validation does not constitute a
clearly articulated policy compelled by the state. 81 The dissent
76. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17.
77. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
78. Defendants contended for the first time on rehearing that effective January 5,
1974, the Arizona Court adopted Rule 28(c)(VII)(B) to include a requirement that the
Bar file with the Court thirty days before each examination the proposed formula for
grading the entire examination. The analysis might have been different had this provision been brought to the attention of the district court. Ronwin, 686 F.2d at 697.
79. See Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975, 76 COL. L. REV. 191, 200
(1976).
80. The Supreme Court in Goldfarb stated: "It is no disparagement of the practice
of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has a business aspect, .... " 421 U.S. at
788.
81. Ostensibly, the dissent was seeking the protection of the learned professions exemption which emphasizes a relative weighing of the harms and benefits of a challenged
activity, absent the compulsion requirement. Even under this alternate theory, an "implied validation" does not justify the Bar's grading procedure as there was no direct
contribution to the regulatory purpose of serving the public.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

45

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 6

1983]

ANTITRUST LAW

93

ignored the heavy presumption against implicit exemptions.82
Countervailing policies must be demonstrated to sufficiently
overcome the presumption. 83
Under Ronwin, the jU!:'!tification for such policies would be
evaluated with respect to their dependence on the challenged activities. The majority applied this relational test to determine
whether the Bar truly acted with dedication to their assigned
task of determining the "necessary qualifications" of applicants
by separating the competent from the incompetent applicants.
By setting the passing score according to the number of applicants to be admitted, the Bar arbitrarily eliminated otherwise
competent applicants. Because all competent applicants were
not admitted, the regulatory purpose was not served. Restricting
the practice of law by limiting the number of those licensed
served only to unreasonably suppress competition among lawyers. The result was an illegal restraint of trade. 84
The majority further upheld the national policy favoring
competition by predicting that plaintiff could establish that this
restraint had a sufficient impact on interstate commerce to invoke the Sherman Act. Recognizing that interstate commerce is
an intensely practical concept drawn from the normal and accepted course of business811 and that legal services play an integral role in that stream of commerce, the court rejected the position that history has accorded the legal profession "a role all its
own."88 Instead of retreating to the "learned professions" doctrine, Ronwin offers a foundation for the development of a more
realistic approach to the issue of professional regulation. Ronwin
does not, as the dissent maintained, disregard the traditional
deference to state discretion in admission procedures. Rather, by
demanding that regulatory policies be legitimately met, the
court has supported the premise that the legal profession exists
82. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 399; Goldfarb, 435 U.S. at 787.
83. 435 U.S. at 400.
84. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 500 (when purchasers or consumers are deprived of the advantages which they derive from free competition, there is
an antitrust violation).
85. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 231 (1947).
86. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957).
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to serve the public.
Katherine Morrow Ha/ferkamp*

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW
A.

REFINING THE BOUNDS OF THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION

In several recent cases, the Ninth Circuit examined the
Parker state action exemption,l expanding the scope of the exemption to parties who promote a clearly articulated state
policy.
In Miller v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n,2 plaintiffs,
owners of a cafe and tavern, sued the Oregon State Liquor Commission and liquor wholesalers, alleging that the pricing practices promulgated and enforced by the Commission violated the
Sherman Act. 8 Without expressing any opinion as to whether
the practices in fact constituted antitrust violations, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's holding that Oregon's involvement in regulation and control of the liquor industry" was
sufficient to establish immunity from federal antitrust law under
the state action exemption.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Oregon law did not
meet the state supervision requirement of the exemption. As in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum/'
the state neither established prices, monitored, nor reviewed the
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law.

1. The leading case establishing the state action exemption from antitrust liability is
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Parker doctrine provides that parties who act
under the direction of a state government should not incur federal antitrust liability.
The Supreme Court, in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445
U.S. 97 (1980), held that immunity under Parker requires that (1) the challenged restraint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; and,
(2) the policy must be actively supervised by the state itself. [d. at 105.
2. 688 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were
Browning and Boochever, JJ.) (as amended on denial of rehearing, Sept. 27, 1982).
3. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
4. See OR. ADMIN. R. 845-10-210 (1980), OR. ADMIN. R. 845-6-090 (1981).
5. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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reasonableness of the price schedules. Because there was no
"pointed reexamination" of the pricing program, the Oregon law
was distinguishable from other states' laws completely controlling the distribution of liquor, which had been granted antitrust
immunity.s Such comprehensive regulation is immune under
Parker because "the state' has substituted its own supervision
for the economic constraints of the competitive market."7 In
Miller, however, regardless of whether the law was one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, Oregon's
mere authorization and enforcement of the pricing program was
insufficient to establish antitrust immunity.
In Benson u. Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners,8
plaintiffs challenged Arizona's regulation of the practice of dentistry. Arizona's regulatory scheme distinguishes between "licenses" to practice dentistry, which are granted only to those
who pass the state's dentistry examination, and "restricted permits", for which that examination is not a prerequiste. Holders
of restricted permits are allowed to practice dentistry, but only
as unsalaried employees of charitable dental clinics. Plaintiffs,
all of whom held licenses to practice dentistry in other states,
contended that the scheme violated federal and state antitrust
laws. 9 Plaintiffs alleged that the Board had combined with Arizona dentists and dentists' organizations to restrain and monopolize the practice of dentistry in the state by restricting entry
into the profession, limiting the number of dentists and fixing
prices. The Ninth Circuit held that the Board was immune from
antitrust liability under the state action exemption. 10
Because the system was clearly articulated in state statutes l l and was actively supervised by a state agency, the Ninth
Circuit found both of the Midcal criteria12 satisfied. The court
6. 688 F.2d at 1226. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 4-15 (1979).
7. 688 F.2d at 1225, quoting P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, I ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATION 73 (1978).
8. 673 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were
Ferguson, J. and Orrick, D.J., sitting by designation) (as amended, May 17, 1982).
9. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of their constitutional rights of due process, equal
protection and interstate travel. The court found those allegations to be without merit.
[d. at 276-78.
10. [d. at 276.
n. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1201-32-1290 (1976).
12. See supra note 1.
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emphasized that the detailed nature of the statutory scheme illustrated the Arizona legislature's intent to affirmatively mandate a state policy for the regulation of dentistry.I3 Supervision
by the Board of Dental Examiners for licensing was found to be
the equivalent of supervision by the Arizona Supreme Court of
the state's ban on attorney advertising in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona. 14 The Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff's assertions that
the Board acted outside the scope of the legislature's directives
and therefore state action immunity was inapplicable. The
Board needed only to show that the authority it was given implied that the legislature contemplated the kind of action
taken. Iii
The Ninth Circuit further found that the Arizona dental
regulations satisfied a second criterion mandated by Bates for
applying the state action exemption: existence of a strong state
interest in the challenged restraint. Bates emphasized that
states have a vital interest in protecting the public by regulating
the legal profession, and that such regulation had been a traditional state function. 18 The Benson court found the regulation of
dentistry, as a healing profession, equally a traditional state
function to protect the public.l"l
In Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs,18 the issue was
whether an agreement between competitors at the same level of
the market structure to share the use of a racetrack facility essential to their horseracing business constituted a "horizontal restraint",.' and was therefore a per se violation of the antitrust
13. 673 F.2d at 275 n.4. Arizona statutes, supra note 11, established the Board, conferred upon it the power to regulate the practice of dentistry and control admission
thereto, and commanded it to administer examinations "on both theory and clinical proficiency" as a prerequiste for dental licenses and establish the system of restricted permits. [d. at 275.
14. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
15. 673 F.2d 272, 276 n.8 (emphasis in Benson).
16. 433 U.S. at 361-62.
17. 673 F.2d at 275 n.6. The court·distinguished Benson from Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982), in that Arizona's legislature affirmatively mandated the challenged policies, rather than adopting a neutral stance toward regulation of dentists. 673 F.2d at 275 n.4.
18. 670 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were
Wright, J. and Poole, J., concurring specially) (as amerided, Feb. 26, 1982), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2308 (1982).
19. 670 F.2d at 820.
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laws. The Ninth Circuit held that it was not. Although the
Ninth Circuit expressed its interest in promoting competition,
the court reasoned that finding a violation in this case would
effectively reduce competition. 20 The court recognized that the
plaintiff's real objective was to increase its own control. over the
facility, not to increase the extent to which all competitors share
in the use of the facility. Alternatively, the court held that the
allocation provisions of the agreement were immune from antitrust law under Parker.21
Citing the Midcal criteria and its recent application by the
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit found that application of the
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar22 "compulsion" test was not required. 23 Rather, the relevant inquiry when regulated industries
"involve a blend of public and private decisionmaking"24 is the
degree to which the state or its agency has put "its own weight
on the side of [the challenged regulation]."211 Arizona statutes
limit the number of days allowed for horseracing and allocated
those days to the most qualified applicants through issuance of
permits. 26 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the underlying
public policy evidenced by the state's regulation was a strong
interest in controlling horseracing because it is incident to gambling. 27 The Ninth Circuit found allocation by private agreement
integrated within this statutory scheme. Therefore, such allocation was included in the state's clearly articulated policy to replace unfettered competition in application for racing dates with
regulation. 28
The Ninth Circuit further held that the state's obligation to
"thoroughly investigate" permit applications constituted active
state supervision. Because an applicant must meet all the relevant criteria, the state in effect did review the "reasonableness"
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
(1974).
26.
27.
28.

[d.
[d. at 822.
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
670 F.2d 813, 823 n.8.
[d., quoting Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592 (1976).
670 F.2d at 823 n.8. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357
[d. at 824. See ARIZ.
670 F.2d at 825.
[d.
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of the private date allocation. 29
The Miller court confined its analysis to the state supervision requirement of the state action exemption. The view that
immunity should be granted only when the state has substituted
its own supervision for the constraints of the competitive market
also guided the Ninth Circuit in Benson and Turf Paradise. But
the Benson and Turf Paradise opinions emphasized that when a
strong state interest underlies the policy articulated, the vitality
of that interest may reduce the need to meet the second Midcal
criterion, i.e., active supervision by the state of the challenged
activity.
In Benson, although the statute did not itself enumerate all
the requirements that the Board imposed, the Ninth Circuit refused to conclude that the Board exceeded its authority. so As
long as the Board took the kind of action which furthered the
state interest in regulating the medical professions, its ability to
refer to specific detailed legislative authorization was
unnecessary.
Similarly, in Turf Paradise, the Ninth Circuit stressed the
strong state interest involved. The private parties were not compelled to impose the challenged regulation. The state only "in
effect" supervised the private regulation. But because the state
clearly intended to avoid the consequences of unrestricted competition in what was essentially a gambling operation, private
regulation in furtherance of such an interest received state action immunity. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Miller was content to require strict adherence to the state supervision requirement because there was no strong public sentiment surrounding
the regulation of the liquor industry. The situation in Miller was
purely economic and the court was not moved to consider public
policy.
The pattern to be derived from these three cases is that the
Ninth Circuit will impose an objective standard unless the issue
at bar concerns an area in which the state has a vital interest.
Deference may then be given to that interest regardless of
29. [d.

30. 673 F.2d at 275·76.
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whether there is active supervision by the state.
B.

THE SEPARATE NATURE OF Two PRODUCTS IN AN ALLEGED
TYING ARRANGEMENT

An illegal tying arrangement involves a seller who refuses to
sell one product (the tying product) unless the buyer also
purchases a second product (the tied product) from the seller.
Such arrangements are proscribed by the Sherman Antitrust
Act31 and the Clayton Act3S since this type of aggregation impedes market competition on the merits of the tied product. To
establish the existence of a tying arrangement, there must be
two separate products involved, with the sale of one conditioned
upon the purchase of the other; the seller must engage in a modicum of coercive conduct toward the buyer; the seller must possess economic power in the market for the tying product; and a
not insubstantial amount of commerce must be affected by the
arrangement. 33 In three recent decisions, the Ninth Circuit addressed the first of these elements, the separate nature of the
two products in an alleged tying arrangement.
In Krehl u. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.,u a class action
antitrust suit was brought by franchised store owners who were
bound by an agreement with Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.
(BRICO) and area franchisors. The agreement permitted
franchised store owners to sell only Baskin-Robbins ice cream
products purchased from the area franchisor in whose territory
the store is located. BRICO licensed the area franchisors to use
Baskins-Robbins trademarks and formulae to manufacture Baskin-Robbins ice cream and establish franchised stores. The
plaintiffs alleged that the sale of the franchised store was illegally tied to the purchase of the seller's ice cream. 311
31. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
32. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1975).
33. See Hirsch v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1982),
and cases cited therein.
34. 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Ely, J.; the other panel members were Reinhardt, J., and Cordova, D.J., sitting by designation) (rehearing and rehearing en banc
.
denied, Feb. 24, 1982).
35. Plaintiff also alleged that BRICO's "dual distribution" system operated as an
unlawful horizontal market allocation and that BRICO and its area franchisors conspired
to fix prices. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish either of these claims.
[d. at 1354-58.
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The court first looked to the nature of the products involved
in the alleged aggregation. The franchised stores were characterized by the license to use BRICO's trademark, so the trademark
allegedly operated as the tying product and the ice cream as the
tied product. In an earlier case, Siegal v. Chicken Delight,36 the
Ninth Circuit had found that, under certain circumstances, a
trademark may be sufficiently unrelated to the alleged tied
product to warrant treatment as a separate item. 37 However, the
court found the facts of Siegal to be inapposite and held that
the Baskin-Robbins trademark was not distinguishable as a separate product from Baskin-Robbins ice cream.
The difference between Siegal and the instant case lay in
the franchising structure. In Siegal, the franchisor had a business format franchise system created merely to conduct business
under a common tradename. In such a system there is a remote
connection between the trademark and the products the
franchisors are compelled to purchase. The trademark, the tying
product, was used to compel the purchase of items such as paper
cups which were commonly available elsewhere at lower prices.
Consumers had no reason to associate the trademark with the
tied goods. Because a trademark represents goodwill and standards of quality, the source of component products does not
matter so long as the standards of quality are met. 38
On the other hand, BRICO operated on a distribution
franchise system. The franchised stores served as "conduits
through which the trademarked goods of the franchisor flow to
the ultimate consumer."39 The product was prepared by the
franchisor or licensees· o according to detailed specifications.
Thus the treatment served not only to identify the business format, but it also represented the quality of the product. The
trademark and the product were inextricably linked in the mind
of the consumer. The court noted that it would be consumer
36. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
37. [d. at 48-49.
38. 664 F.2d at 1353.
39. [d.
40. The court rejected the contention that even though Baskin-Robbins ice cream is
manufactured by licensees instead of BRICO, the trademark must be a separate product
because "the trademark still serves only to identity that distinctive ice cream is made in
accordance with secret formulae and processes developed by BRICO." [d. at 1353-54
n.14.
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fraud to sell a less expensive brand of ice cream under the
BRICO trademark. 41
Since the BRICO trademark identifies the ice cream sold in
the franchised stores, the ice cream and the trademark do not
exist independent of one another. An illegal tying agreement
under the antitrust laws requires as its first element the existence of two distinct products,4lI therefore the BRICO trademark
could not be illegally tied to the ice cream sold in its franchised
stores. 43
Hamro u. Shell Oil CO.44 presented the Ninth Circuit with a
similar fact situation. Plaintiff, a service station operator,
brought suit under the Cartwright Act, the California antitrust
statute. 411 The plaintiff operated his service station under lease
and dealer agreements with Shell. The complaint alleged that
the lease was conditioned upon the purchase of gasoline from
the oil company. However, the court found that the lease was
not based on any purchasing condition nor did the lease require
the lessee to enter a dealer agreement with Shell. 46

The dealer agreement signed by the plaintiff did not require
that he purchase Shell gasoline, and it further stipulated that
the plaintiff could not use the Shell trademark unless he purchased gasoline from Shell. Citing Baskin-Robbins, the Ninth
Circuit found that the Shell trademark is not a product separate
from Shell gasoline. 47 Therefore, an illegal tying arrangement
could not exist using a "source trademark" and the product it
represents. 48
41. [d. at 1354 n.15.

42. [d. at 1352.
43. [d. at 1354.
44. 674 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Canby, J.; the other panel members were
Fletcher, J. and Copple, D.J., sitting by designation) (as amended on denial of rehearing,
Aug. 25, 1982).
45. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600 et seq., 16720, 16726, 16727 (West 1964). The
court found that these codes were modeled after the Sherman Antitrust Act so that fed·
eral case law could be used to interpret the California statute. See 674 F.2d at 786·87.
Plaintiff also presented claims for intentional interference with business advantage and
unlawful price discrimination. The court held for the defendant on all the claims
presented. [d. at 786.
46. [d. at 787.
47. [d.
48. [d. at 788.
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Although no trademark was involved, the separate products
issue was also decisive in a third case, Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc. 49 Plaintiff, an attorney, brought suit under the Sherman and Clayton Acts alleging two illegal tying arrangements in
connection with the defendant's directory of attorneys. The directory offers two types of advertisements to attorneys, apart
from the regular listings: informative cards and professional
cards. Attorneys wishing to purchase informative or professional
cards must also subscribe to the directory. In order to buy a professional card, one must also purchase an informative card. The
defendant allowed narrow exceptions to these requirements for
foreign attorneys and those sharing office space with a subscribing attorney.IIO The plaintiff alleged that the sale of informative
cards was illegally tied to the sale of the directory and that the
sale of professional cards was illegally tied to the sale of informative cards. The lower court had granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendant. III
The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the relationship between
the informative cards and the directory to determine whether
the separate products element of a tying arrangement had been
satisfied. Since the purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent
efforts to impede competition without regard to the merits of
the product, the court looked at the effect of the relationship.
The court found that because effective advertising requires both
listings and circulation, the requirement that attorneys advertising in the directory also subscribe to it results in a wider dissemination of the listings. 1I2 The quality of the advertising within the
directory is thus improved, which is the opposite of an effort to
impede competiton on the merits of the product. This "synergistic relationship" between the informative cards and the directory itself precludes a finding that they are separate products.
Such an arrangement promotes consumer welfare by contributing to the quality of the product. liS
The informative cards were also found to be inseparable
49. 674 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Ely, J.; the other panel members were Hug
and Alarcon, JJ.) (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, June 15, 1982).
50. 674 F.2d at 1345·46.
51. [d. at 1346.
52. [d. at 1348.
53. [d.
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from the professional cards for the purposes of the tying arrangement analysis. In order to be separate products, there must
be separate markets for each. The court found that since both
cards constituted legal advertising, they had identical audiences
and the same competitors. Thus there was no danger to free
competition to allow the sale of one to be conditioned upon the
purchase of the other.IH

54. [d. at 1350.
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